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 “‘Thee it behoves to take another road.’”  
(Virgil to Dante) 
The Divine Comedy, Inferno, Canto I1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has sadly become trite to observe that we live in a post-truth 
society.2 The hallmark of a post-truth society is its reliance upon 
alternative facts.3 Such alternative facts are no longer grounded in 
empirical evidence or governed by the basic laws of logic.4 Instead, 
 
1. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 9 (Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, trans., 
Barnes & Nobles Inc., 2016). This article is about the value of stepping off a seemingly 
direct path and finding a different way to one’s goal that is premised in a broader quest for 
understanding.  The conversation between Dante and Virgil is one such stepping off—
Dante found his way barred and looked for a guide to take another road.  This road is 
allegorical in the Divine Comedy.  But importantly for this article, it is also programmatic 
for the act of writing the poem: Dante translates Virgil, Latin to Italian, epic hexameter to 
terza rima, and the adoration of Venus and Caesar to a Christian context.  Longfellow in 
turn translates Dante—Italian into English, European high middle ages to American 
romanticism and classicism to an opening to modern literatures. Our understanding of 
truth and identity, and our exercise of judgment changes when we take that different road.  
And in taking it, more often than not, translation is a key map to keep us from getting lost 
in the woods. 
2. See S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the Challenge, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137-38 (2017) (discussing the post-truth problem). 
3. Id. 
4. Compare Trump Holds Firm for Kavanaugh but Calls Accuser Credible, ASSOC. PRESS 
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://apnews.com/2650e44f2a73484da4c29ca4343dc6f5 
[https://perma.cc/22M5-NCZS] (President Trump finding testimony by a woman accusing 
Brett Kavanaugh of sexual assault “very compelling”), with Peter Baker, Trump Bets 
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commentators submit that public discourse today is dominated by 
those who peddle in narrative with callous disregard for the truth.5 
Lawyers frequently assert that the rule of law is a potent 
antidote against such an attitude to the truth.6 The rule of law was 
thought of as a check against tin-pot dictators and authoritarian 
rule after the fall of the Soviet Union.7 The link is certainly 
cemented deeply enough within our collective subconscious 
through the clockwork repetition of images of young dashing 
lawyers (frequently played by Tom Cruise) extracting a truth we 
supposedly cannot handle from mendacious authority figures in 
the name of law and justice.8 
The problem is that—on the world stage at least—this 
assertion may be a myth. If one were to ask an international judge 
how she would get to the truth or examine the evidence, she would 
tell us “I am guided by my intimate conviction.”9 While her intimate 
conviction might differ from that of, say, President Vladimir Putin 
of Russia or Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina with regard 
to a specific brewing international incident, she could not in fact 
 
Kavanaugh ‘Hoax’ Turns into Midterm Gains, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/politics/trump-kavanaugh-accusations-
hoax.html [https://perma.cc/3UNY-STGP] (President Trump asserting the same 
accusation is “‘a hoax’ and ‘fabricated.’”). 
5. See Quinta Jurecic, On Bullshit and the Oath of Office: The “LOL Nothing Matters” 
Presidency, LAWFARE (Nov. 23, 2016, 11:28 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/bullshit-
and-oath-office-lol-nothing-matters-presidency [https://perma.cc/B5QU-P8AS]; Roger 
Cohen, Donald Trump Just Cannot Help It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/opinion/donald-trump-illegal-immigration-
border-wall.html [https://perma.cc/8YF9-F3XQ]; HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT 
passim (2005). 
6. See Thomas Burri, Regulating the Risk of Trumpism, 8 EUR. J. RISK REG. 64, 64-65 
(2017) (“New ways need to be found to fortify the rule of law against lies, hatred, and 
violence which, in a post-truth age, spread unfiltered”); but see David S. Rubenstein, Taking 
Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 205 (2018) (“Especially in a ‘post-truth’ 
era, where perceptions dominate over facts, rule of law arguments that turn on contestable 
facts and framings will never convince non-believers.”). 
7. John K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development 
Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 247-48 
(2007). 
8. A FEW GOOD MEN (Castle Rock Entertainment 1992) (Kaffee: “I WANT THE 
TRUTH!” Jessup: “YOU CAN’T HANDLE THE TRUTH!”); see also THE FIRM (Davis 
Entertainment, Mirage Enterprises 1993) (“It’s not sexy, but it’s got teeth! Ten thousand 
dollars and five years in prison. That’s ten and five for each act. Have you really looked at 
that?”). 
9. See PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION 189 
(2013) (discussing the use of the intimate conviction standard in international law). 
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tell either of them how she approached the evidence differently 
from both men in advancing their respective political claims.10 All 
she could have told us is to trust her (and, perhaps, not them). 
This blind spot is deeply problematic. As this Article submits, 
the rule of law on the world stage is at risk of being guided by 
narrative as much as the post-truth populism against which it is 
invoked. Post-truth populists use narratives to anchor seemingly 
empirical statements (“largest crowd ever”) in a group’s own 
mythologies of self-worth (“we are the moral majority”).11 In the 
legal context, narratives are similarly omni-present. Narratives in 
the legal context guide factfinding through the central use of 
presumptions. These presumptions come to be used when there is 
inconclusive evidence to determine what took place. Centrally, 
decisionmakers in those instances look at the record through the 
lens of a presumption that actors conduct themselves in good 
faith.12 They acted as they ought to have acted. This approach 
dangerously short circuits the fact-finding process. 
In more concrete terms, Professors Oona Hathaway and Scott 
Shapiro have studied an exhaustive historical record of pre-1928 
war manifestos.13 They explain that “[b]y making the reasons for 
war manifest, manifestos sought to make clear that the war in 
question was just.”14 A just war, in turn, was waged on permissible 
legal grounds, meaning that the manifestos referred to serious 
 
10. Julia Ioffe, What Putin Really Wants, ATLANTIC (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/putins-game/546548/ 
[https://perma.cc/2W72-6WAZ] (“Putin and Lavrov were known within the Obama 
administration for their long tirades, chastising the American president for all the 
disrespect shown to Russia since 1991”); Michael D. Shear, Furious Lindsey Graham Calls 
Kavanaugh Hearing ‘the Most Unethical Sham’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/us/politics/lindsey-graham-kavanaugh-
hearing.html [https://perma.cc/SHL4-22YP]. 
11. Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative Facts’ on Crowd 
Size, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-
conway-alternative-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/LDH2-MHUC]; Alternative Facts' 
Remark Tops 2017 List of Notable Quotes, FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.foxnews.com/us/alternative-facts-remark-tops-2017-list-of-notable-
quotes [https://perma.cc/82Z2-SUBZ].  
12. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 305 (2006). 
13. OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS, HOW A RADICAL PLAN 
TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 31-81 (2017). 
14. Id. at 40. 
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grievances that sounded in the then-existing international law.15 
Applying the presumptions developed in international law that 
parties act honesty and reasonably, it would follow that no state 
ever invaded another purely for reasons of conquest. This 
conclusion is facially naïve. In fact, Hathaway and Shapiro have 
debunked it as historically inaccurate.16 The very fact-finding 
process underlying a rule of law approach to conflict resolution 
thus would be dangerously blind to the actual facts and construct 
a reality out of its own, narrative-based “alternative” facts. 
This Article argues that this state of affairs requires us 
fundamentally to re-think how factfinding processes must work. It 
argues that existing global factfinding processes can be redeemed 
if they do not assume that facts can be constructed out of a single 
narrative. Instead, it submits that factfinding must actively 
translate between narratives of the parties affected by the dispute. 
This reconstruction of the factfinding process relies upon the 
principle of good faith. This principle requires, in broad contours, 
that parties act with other regard. This Article applies this principle 
to the factfinding process itself by requiring that facts are 
established with other regard, that is with due respect to the 
respective narratives through which the parties encounter the 
dispute. 
This approach allows factfinding premised in the rule of law 
to make sense of factual claims even when they cannot be 
empirically tested. It focuses not on what was. Such a focus would 
be unlikely ever to become testable and as such leads to proof by 
narrative alone. Rather, it focuses on communicative effects. It can 
create a context in which conduct is meaningful because of the 
interaction between the narratives of the affected parties, and thus 
tests narratives against each other and finds the truth in this 
interplay between narratives. 
Again, in the context of examining the causes of war, this is 
what diligent historians do when they examine the stated causes 
for armed conflict. Professor Christopher Clark’s explanation of 
how (rather than why) World War I came about is a masterful 
display of such research: he notes, consistent with the approach of 
 
15. Id. 
16. See id. at 42, 97 (noting that manifestos “matter precisely because they are 
propaganda” and that “Hugo Grotius was not the great apostle of peace. He was the great 
apologist for war.”). 
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looking to communicative effects, that “the focus on how suggests 
an alternative approach: a journey through the events that is not 
driven by the need to draw up a charge sheet against this or that 
state or individual, but aims to identify decisions that brought war 
about and to understand the reasoning or emotions behind 
them.”17 He goes on that this “does not mean excluding questions 
of responsibility entirely from the discussion—the aim is rather to 
let the why answers grow, as it were, out of the how answers rather 
than the other way around.”18 It is thus focus on the between—the 
interaction of decisions in light of what was known to each of the 
players when the decision was made and the real time knock on 
effect of each decision. Another historical masterpiece using a 
similar approach is David Herbert Donald’s biography of Abraham 
Lincoln, which seeks to explain to us the basis for his decisions as 
they were made rather than fall prey to hindsight bias.19 
As this Article will show, this new approach is fundamentally 
consistent with best practices in the international jurisprudence. It 
does, however, permit a more nuanced legal critique of decisions 
that should be intuitively problematic. It thus advances the 
understanding of how international law fact-finding can live up to 
its rule of law aspirations and provides a new doctrinal toolkit to 
improve the quality of justice before international courts and 
tribunals. 
More broadly, this Article shows how the rule of law can in 
fact become instrumental in engagement in a post-truth society. It 
creates a means of engagement with others even when parties rely 
predominantly on narratives. It therefore showcases how the rule 
of law is not an antagonist to populist rhetoric. Rather, it shows 
how the application of the rule of law in fact can overcome the 
challenges of participating in a post-truth discourse. The rule of 
law, in other words, can continue to live up to its lofty promise and 
aspirations. To do so, the rule of law must however, become more 
yielding and listen rather than engaging in the traditional trope of 
a Tom Cruise-lookalike shouting at authority at the top of his lungs. 
This Article is organized in five parts. Part I introduces the 
apparent methodological sloppiness of international judges and 
 
17. CHRISTOPHER CLARK, THE SLEEPWALKERS: HOW EUROPE WENT TO WAR IN 1914 xxviii 
(2012) (emphasis in original). 
18. Id. (emphasis in original). 
19. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 13 (1995). 
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arbitrators in their engagement with record facts. Part II will then 
explain that this apparent methodological sloppiness, thankfully, is 
only skin deep. International courts and tribunals do have set 
means by which they scrutinize evidence. This means of analyzing 
and testing evidence is anchored in burdens of proof and standards 
of proof. These burdens and standards of proof, in turn, are 
influenced by the presumptions; courts use these presumptions in 
attempts to do material justice rather than mechanizing claim 
resolutions. 
Part III then sets out the doctrinal rules governing the use of 
presumptions and inferences proper. It explains how 
presumptions and inferences come to be used in the complete 
record context and thus underlines again the vital role 
presumptions play in international justice. Part IV explains the 
problem encountered by presumptions due to their grounding in 
the principle of good faith. Part IV explains that the current use of 
good faith runs into an is-ought problem and becomes reliant upon 
narrative as a tool of dispute resolution that it is no longer able to 
test by empirical means. Part V concludes with a normative 
proposal how to improve the link between truth and 
(international) rule of law. This proposal is to take seriously the 
grounding of presumptions in doctrines of good faith as other 
regard, and explain how this grounding is doctrinally defensible 
and helps in overcoming the narrative problem created by the 
necessary reliance upon presumptions in a rule of law based 
factfinding paradigm. 
II. A PRIMA FACIE LACK OF FACTUAL RIGOR 
Rule of law has long been held out as an antidote to 
authoritarian rule. As part of the Washington consensus, the rule 
of law was thought to hem in the margin of maneuver for dictators 
and populist leaders.20 Significantly, the rule of law was also 
thought of a means to confront and debunk authoritarian 
propaganda and return decision-making and international public 
discourse to a rational engagement of facts.21 
Despite its importance as an antidote to propaganda, rule of 
law advocates have reasonably neglected to explain how this goal 
 
20. Burri, supra note 6, at 64-65. 
21. Ohnesorge, supra note 7, at 247-48. 
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should be achieved. The closest set of rules to the broader problem 
we experience is the law of evidence, that is the law governing how 
those applying the rule of law themselves gather facts. But the law 
of evidence remains a doctrinally under-developed field. 
Consequently, the treatment of evidentiary issues in international 
decisions, as well as in scholarship discussing these decisions 
frequently lacks apparent rigor. 
One such example of a facial lack of evidentiary rigor is the 
Pulp Mills case between Argentina and Uruguay.22 Argentina 
alleged that Uruguay had acted in violation of the 1975 Statute of 
the River Uruguay by building pulp mills on its shores, thereby 
impermissibly affecting the river’s water quality.23 The Court held 
that Uruguay had breached its procedural obligations to consult 
but had not breached its substantive obligations under the 1975 
Statute.24 Specifically, Uruguay had failed to pass on appropriate 
environmental impact assessments as required by the treaty.25 
Uruguay had not however violated its obligations not to pollute or 
change the ecological balance of the river.26 
As lawyers are not environmental scientists versed in river 
ecosystems, the Court required the aide of expertise.27 The parties 
did not however provide the relevant expertise directly.28 Rather, 
they hired consultants to appear as co-counsel. By doing so, they 
shielded the consultants from being examined by the Court or 
opposing counsel.29 
Understandably, the Court was frustrated with this strategic 
choice as it complicated its fact-finding mission and let the parties 
know as much in its judgment.30 Nevertheless, the Court pressed 
on. The Court explained that it “does not find it necessary in order 
to adjudicate the present case to enter into a general discussion on 
the relative merits, reliability and authority of the documents and 
 
22. Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urug.), Judgment, 2010 
I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Pulp Mills]. 
23. Id. at 25. 
24. Id. at 106. 
25. Id. at 60. 
26. Id. at 86. 
27. Id. at 72. 
28. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J at 72. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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studies prepared by the experts and consultants of the Parties.”31 
What is more, the Court noted (again with a hint of annoyance) that 
“despite the volume and complexity of the factual information 
submitted to it,” it would continue with its mission.32 It explained 
“in keeping with its practice, the Court will make its own 
determination of the facts, on the basis of the evidence presented 
to it, and then it will apply the relevant rules of international law 
to those facts which it has found to have existed.”33 
While one can certainly feel the Court’s pain oozing through 
these passages, a common law trained lawyer would balk at this 
manner of discussing evidence. How can a case be decided on the 
merits that by all accounts requires expert evidence without 
passing “on the relative merits, reliability and authority of the 
documents and studies prepared by the experts and consultants of 
the Parties?”34 How exactly can the Court make “its own 
determination of facts” without such comments? It would seem to 
be beyond the Court’s ability (or any lawyer’s ability for that 
matter) to pass judgment on the impact of discharges on Uruguay 
water qualities without expert evidence.35 This, however, is 
precisely what the Court appears to imply it is able to do. 
The discussion of evidentiary standards in Pulp Mills 
showcases the overall problem well. The Court is aware of an 
underlying deficiency in the manner in which a case was brought 
to it for decision.36 Rather than engage the morass of a record 
created by the parties head on, however, the Court seeks to elevate 
itself above the fray;37 One could perhaps picture an imaginary 
motto hanging in chambers in the Hague—“When they go low, we 
go high.”38 It then seeks to resolve by clean legal analysis what the 
parties left unresolved through careful factual proof.39 
Problematically, however, this exercise stands to succeed only if 
 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 72. 
33. Id. 
34. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 73. 
35. Id. at 91-99. 
36. Id. at 72-73. 
37. Id. 
38. Quotes from Hillary Clinton’s Convention, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/opinion/sunday/quotes-from-hillary-clintons-
convention.html?searchResultPosition=10 [https://perma.cc/Q6TR-XHLY]. 
39. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 91-99. 
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the Court is able to make sense of what the parties, to its mind, 
strategically sought to obfuscate. Unless the Court can bring legal 
tools to bear to sort out the evidentiary mess, it would seem that it 
could only make a bad decision. 
The Court is sadly no exception when it comes to the 
underdevelopment of the treatment of evidence. International 
arbitration commentators noted that the only rule of evidence in 
international arbitration was the discretion of the arbitrator.40 
These commentators in fact credit the practice before the 
International Court of Justice as instructive on questions of 
evidence before international arbitral tribunals.41 Such comments 
would invite reasonably similar types of decisions in international 
arbitration, as well. 
This potential conclusion is deeply problematic. Any legal 
analysis is only as solid as the factual foundation upon which it is 
built. Moreover, factual findings frequently drive the result in 
international arbitrations or adjudications.42 This would suggest 
that international dispute resolution has a potentially serious 
foundation problem as well as a serious legitimacy problem. 
This problem becomes more pronounced when we look to 
international law fact-finding as an antidote to the post-truth 
syndrome in current political discourse. The problem with the 
post-truth syndrome is that there are no hallmarks for how one 
should anchor discourse in some form of discernible reality.43 
Rather, it is possible for discourse participants to disappear into 
narratives without much risk to be brought back to earth by means 
of fact checking.44 The discussion so far has shown that 
international justice has work to do in order to fare much better—
or provide the tools by which the rule of law could address the 
post-truth syndrome more broadly. So far, there does not appear 
to be a clear matrix according to which the rule of law could reign 
in the post-truth syndrome. All it can offer so far is the advice to 
 
40. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 641-45 (2d ed. 
2009). 
41. Id. 
42. Stanimir Alexandrov, Remarks, in 2 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 205 (Ian Laird & Todd Weiler eds., 2009). 
43. Strong, supra note 2, at 145. 
44. Id. 
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trust the discretion of appointed decision-makers. In the current 
political context, such a request is reasonably naïve. 
II. Burdens and Standards of Proof 
The starting point for any account how the international rule 
of law approaches fact-finding is to understand the role played by 
burdens and standards of proof in international justice. The 
concepts of burdens and standards of proof are the first principles 
that allow for an orderly decision-making process in contested 
cases. They both rest on the insight that there is a difference 
between allegation and proof—and that the person doing the 
alleging is also the person who should do the proving. This Part 
outlines how that particular insight operates in international 
justice. The key insight it offers is that burdens of proof and 
standards of proof are not the sterile, blindly operated scales of 
courthouse art. Rather, burdens and standards of proof are 
tethered to evidentiary presumptions, which implicitly embed a 
narrative about the world within the very operation of 
international justice. 
A. Burden of Proof 
1. The Basic Rule in Action 
The International Court of Justice is a foundational source for 
key concepts of burdens of proof in international justice. Our Pulp 
Mills test case reveals the extent to which the Court tends to rely 
on burdens of proof to resolve disputes.45 As already discussed 
above, the Pulp Mills case involved reasonably complicated 
scientific questions which were left unaddressed by competent 
expert testimony and cross-examination.46 The Court therefore 
appeared to suggest that it would make its own evidentiary 
findings without going into a detailed examination of the expert 
submissions.47 
A careful analysis of the relevant substantive sections of the 
Pulp Mills decision leads to a deeply surprising result: the Court did 
not ultimately end up making factual findings despite its facial 
promise to do so on the face of the judgment. Argentina advanced 
 
45. Pulp Mills, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 14-15 (Apr. 20). 
46. Id. at 72-73. 
47. Id. 
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as its core submissions that Uruguay had failed to (1) contribute to 
the optimum rational utilization of the river; (2) ensure that the 
management of the soil and woodlands would not impair the 
quality of river waters; (3) to coordinate measures to avoid 
changes in the ecological balance; and (4) to prevent pollution and 
preserve the aquatic environment by discharging (a) dissolved 
oxygen, (b) phosphorus, (c) phenolic substances, (d) nonylphenols, 
(e) dioxins and furans, as well as (f) negatively affecting 
biodiversity.48 The Court addressed these submissions in turn.49 
The Court joined the first submission advanced by Argentina 
on optimum rational utilization of the river to its substantive 
analysis of the specific pollution claims advanced by Argentina.50 
The Court rejected Argentina’s second submission concerning the 
management of the soil and woodlands because “Argentina has not 
provided any evidence to support its contention.”51 It similarly 
concluded with regard to Argentina’s third contention, i.e., 
Uruguay had failed to coordinate measures to avoid changes in the 
ecological balance, that “Argentina has not convincingly 
demonstrated that Uruguay has refused to engage in such co-
ordination as envisaged by Article 36, in breach of that 
provision.”52 The Court adopted a similar method to address the 
specific pollution claims raised by Argentina. It ruled as follows 
with regard to Argentina’s specific claims: 
 
 Dissolved oxygen claim: “the Court finds that the allegation made by Argentina 
remains unproven.”53 
 
 Phosphorous claim: “The Court finds that based on the evidence before it, the 
Orion (Botnia) mill has so far complied with the standard for total phosphorus 
in effluent discharge.”54 
 
 
48. Id. at 14-55. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 74 (“Of particular relevance in the present case are its functions relating to 
rule-making in respect of conservation and preservation of living resources, the 
prevention of pollution and its monitoring, and the co-ordination of actions of the Parties. 
These functions will be examined by the Court in its analysis of the positions of the Parties 
with respect to the interpretation and application of Articles 36 and 41 of the 1975 
Statute.”). 
51. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 75. 
52. Id. at 77. 
53. Id. at 93. 
54. Id. at 95. 
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 Phenolic substances claim: “[b]ased on the record, and the data presented by 
the Parties, the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence to attribute 
the alleged increase in the level of concentrations of phenolic substances in the 
river to the operations of the Orion (Botnia) mill.”55 
 
 Nonylphenols claim: “Argentina has not however, in the view of the Court, 
adduced clear evidence which establishes a link between the nonylphenols 
found in the waters of the river and the Orion (Botnia) mill. [. . . . ] The Court 
therefore concludes that the evidence in the record does not substantiate the 
claims made by Argentina on this matter.”56 
 
 Dioxins and furans claim: “The Court considers that there is no clear evidence 
to link the increase in the presence of dioxins and furans in the river to the 
operation of the Orion (Botnia) mill.”57 
 
 Biodiversity claim: “The Court has not, however, found sufficient evidence to 
conclude that Uruguay breached its obligation to preserve the aquatic 
environment including the protection of its fauna and flora.”58 And “[t]he 
record rather shows that a clear relationship has not been established between 
the discharges from the Orion (Botnia) mill and the malformations of rotifers, 
or the dioxin found in the sábalo fish or the loss of fat by clams reported in the 
findings of the Argentine River Uruguay Environmental Surveillance (URES) 
programme.”59 
 
While it might be easy to miss, it is important to note that the 
Court does not make factual findings with regard to claims other 
than the phosphorous claim.60 The Court comes close at times to 
making a factual conclusion.61 For instance, it points to certain 
reports that are inconsistent with Argentina’s submissions.62 But 
such excursions by the Court are not an affirmative determination 
of fact. They do not definitively conclude that dissolved oxygen 
levels in the River Uruguay on the critical date were at or below a 
certain level.63 Given the sophistication of the jurists on the Court, 
it is hard to avoid that this (lack of a) conclusion is purposeful. 
The conclusions in the Pulp Mills case therefore turn entirely 
on the question of burdens of proof. The Court assigned the burden 
 
55. Id. at 97-98. 
56. Id. at 98-99. 
57. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 99. 
58. Id. at 100. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 96. 
61. Id. at 93. 
62. Id. 
63. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 93. 
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to Argentina.64 Argentina did not meet its burden.65 It therefore did 
not make out a claim for relief.66 Put another way, had the burden 
of proof been on Uruguay in this case, Uruguay likely would have 
lost the case. The Court precisely refused to make any affirmative 
factual findings, as we have now seen. Consequently, the burden of 
proof, and the burden of proof alone, was dispositive of the factual 
questions in the case. 
The importance of burdens of proof in the Court’s 
jurisprudence is not unique to the Pulp Mills case. Rather, it is a 
generally accepted proposition that the assignment of the burden 
of proof is a central feature of the factfinding process.67 Pulp Mills 
is a vivid illustration of how this principle is applied even in cases 
in which the Court appears to suggest that it will make findings of 
fact on its own recognizance rather than decide the case on the 
relative strength of the evidence submitted by the parties.68 Even 
in this context, burden is inescapable. 
How then does the Court determine who has the burden of 
proof? The rules on burdens of proof are generally well-
established and straight forward. The Court in the Pulp Mills case 
explained as follows: “in accordance with the well-established 
principle of onus probandi incumbit actori, it is the duty of the party 
which asserts certain facts to establish the existence of such 
facts.”69 It went on to explain that “the Applicant should, in the first 
 
64. Id. at 71. 
65. Id. at 93, 97-8, 98-99, 99, 100. 
66. Id. 
67. Genocide Case (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 3, 73-75 (Feb. 3) (discussing 
the importance of burden of proof); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61, 86 (Feb. 3) (same); Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, 31 (May 
23); Genocide Case (Bos. & Herz. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 127-29 (Feb. 26) 
(same); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 392, 437 (Nov. 26). 
68. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 72-73. 
69. Id. at 71; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 15-
16 (June 15); see CHENG, supra note 12, at 327 (establishing burden of proof as a general 
principle of law); ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 931 (Hart Publishing 
2013) (discussing assignment of burden of proof in International Court of Justice 
jurisprudence); Anna Riddell, Evidence, Fact-Finding, and Experts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF ADJUDICATION 858, 858-59 (Cesare Romano et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the principle in 
current practice); DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 127 
(University Press of Virginia 1939) (discussing the same principle in historical practice). 
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instance, submit the relevant evidence to substantiate its claims.”70 
It went on that “[t]his does not, however, mean that the 
Respondent should not co-operate in the provision of such 
evidence as may be in its possession that could assist the Court in 
resolving the dispute submitted to it.”71 
2. Presumptions Shift the Basic Rule 
The Court in some circumstances is willing to soften this 
operation of the burden of proof as a substitute for fact finding. The 
Diallo case is one example of such a softening.72 In Diallo, Guinea 
brought a case against the Democratic Republic of Congo for the 
mistreatment of one of its nationals at the hands of the Congolese 
authorities.73 Guinea alleged as one part of its case that the 
Democratic Republic of Congo had failed to provide Diallo with 
basic procedural guarantees.74 Given the alleged Kafkaesque 
nature of these infractions, it would have been close to impossible 
for Mr. Diallo (and thus Guinea) to provide documentary proof of 
these infractions. 
The Court in this context appeared willing to adjust the 
ordinary operation of burdens of proof against the moving party.75 
It explained that the burden of proof “varies according to the type 
of facts which it is necessary to establish for the purposes of the 
decision of the case.”76 Specifically, “where, as in these 
proceedings, it is alleged that a person has not been afforded, by a 
public authority, certain procedural guarantees to which he was 
entitled, it cannot as a general rule be demanded of the Applicant 
that it prove the negative fact which it is asserting.”77 
The Court did not however reverse the burden of proof.78 
Cryptically, it concluded that “[i]t is for the Court to evaluate all the 
evidence produced by the two Parties and duly subjected to 
 
70. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71. 
71. Id. 
72. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639 
(Nov. 30) [hereinafter Diallo]. 
73. Id. at 645. 
74. Id. at 659-60. 
75. Compare Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71 (setting out the ordinary operation of 
burdens as quoted above), with Diallo, 2010 I.C.J. at 660 (softening the burden of proof). 
76. Diallo, 2010 I.C.J. at 660. 
77. Id. at 660-61. 
78. Id. at 661. 
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adversarial scrutiny, with a view to forming its conclusions.”79 As 
“when it comes to establishing facts such as those which are at 
issue in the present case, neither party is alone in bearing the 
burden of proof.”80 
Here then, the Court appears to say that it would make the 
kinds of affirmative findings of fact that it avoided in Pulp Mills.81 It 
would no longer rule that it “has not, however, found sufficient 
evidence to conclude that” the Respondent breached its 
obligations.82 Applied more broadly, it would have to hold that on 
the whole, the record requires the making of a finding of fact in 
situations like Diallo. Once such a fact of fact has been made, it 
would then in turn be possible to rule on the question whether a 
respondent has (or has not) breached an international legal 
obligation. 
It is tempting to view the Diallo decision as affecting standards 
of proof rather than burdens of proof. As discussed in the next 
section, the standard of proof governs the amount and quality of 
evidence needed to support a finding. The Diallo Court appears to 
be saying that it will permit Guinea to establish a fact with less 
evidence, or evidence less directly in support of its contentions, 
than it otherwise would have.83 This conclusion would not affect 
burdens of proof. 
The Court, however, does more than that.84 It adjusted the 
burden of proof by introducing a presumption into the operation 
of burdens.85 The presumption it introduced is that governmental 
agencies keep records of their own, ordinary application of 
procedural guarantees in due course.86 This presumption does not 
just substitute for a piece of evidence. Rather, it interacts directly 
with the process of fact finding itself: the presumption affects how 
the Court engages in its fact-finding mission by requiring it to make 
a factual finding unlike the posture in Pulp Mills even in the face of 




81. See generally Pulp Mills (Arg. v. Urug.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20). 
82. Id. at 100. 
83. Diallo, 2010 I.C.J. at 661. 
84. Id. 
85. See id. (“A public authority is generally able to demonstrate that it has followed 
the appropriate procedures”). 
86. Id. 
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than what facts it finds.87 In Pulp Mills a presumption would have 
been one tool to satisfy a burden of proof but the Court could still 
have refused to make a finding at all by reference to applicable 
burdens.88 Diallo invokes a presumption to deprive the Court of 
this option to return nonsuit by ordinary operation of burdens of 
proof.89 
Diallo reveals the fundamental importance of presumptions: 
presumptions can alter the process of fact finding.90 Presumptions 
are applied not to the record but to the manner of application of 
burdens and standards of proof. They can alter even the most basic 
features we take for granted—the rule that the moving party must 
shoulder the burden of proving the facts upon which it relies or fail 
in making out its factual case. This central importance of 
presumptions means that they deserve significant scrutiny as they 
are at the heart of the fact-finding process of international justice—
they define how international justice knows or understands the 
world in which it operates. 
3. Burdens, Presumptions, and (Post-)Truth 
The discussion so far should readily bring to light what our 
problems are if we seek to rely on the international law of evidence 
as the rule of law toolkit to address the post-truth syndrome. First, 
it might certainly seem intuitive to say that the person who wants 
to make a factual submission must prove the point to the 
satisfaction of its audience.91 However, if we apply the Pulp Mills 
matrix to the question of climate change (either existential threat 
or “Chinese hoax”), one might think twice.92 We hear people 
 
87. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 100; FREDERIC G. SOURGENS, KABIR DUGGAL & IAN LAIRD, 
EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 291 (2018) (Evidentiary Principles 
§1(1)). 
88. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 100. 
89. Diallo, 2010 I.C.J. at 661. 
90. Id. 
91. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71. 
92. Louis Jacobsen, Yes, Donald Trump Did Call Climate Change a Chinese Hoax, 
POLITIFACT (June 3, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yes-donald-trump-did-call-climate-
change-chinese-h/ [https://perma.cc/7SBX-H77J]; Andrew O’Reilly, Trump Hedges on 
Climate Change Denial in Wake of Hurricane Michael; Says 'There Is Something There,’ 
FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-hedges-on-
climate-change-denial-in-wake-of-hurricane-michael-says-there-is-something-there 
[https://perma.cc/Q4GB-QRMH]. 
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engaged in the post-truth discourse on climate change say “I am 
not a climate scientist, but . . . ” and then raise cold winter 
temperatures as a reason to doubt “global warming.”93 This is not 
unlike the Pulp Mills decision: in it, the Court seems to say “I am not 
an environmental scientist, but . . . . ” Moreover, to place the burden 
on the party seeking to assert a human link to environmental 
degradation in a mechanical fashion, as Pulp Mills appears to have 
done, is itself a tool all too familiar to any person watching Fox 
News.94 
Second, the embedding of presumptions in the burden of 
proof we encountered in Diallo, too, might look reasonable. But 
again, the question arises: whose presumption governs? 
Presumptions draw on narrative, and if narrative affects the 
manner in which we apply burdens of proof, we are again 
perilously close to falling into the trap of post-truth discourse 
rather than to providing a tool to remedying it. The rule of law, in 
other words, must do better than this use of burdens of proof to 
live up to its aspirations to be a post-truth antidote. A step to 
addressing this problem is the standard of proof. 
B. Standard of Proof 
Global justice in general requires the moving party to 
convince the “inner conviction” of the judge of the facts asserted.95 
Confusingly, this global standard has been compared to the 
preponderance standard and the clear and convincing evidence 
 
93. Rebecca Onion, How to Stop Falling for the “I’m not a Scientist” Trap, SLATE (Nov. 
29, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/donald-trump-not-a-scientist-
climate-denialism-rhetoric.html [https://perma.cc/3P2K-7CPE]; Abby Smith, Trump Says 
World Will ‘Start Getting Cooler’ as Biden Criticizes Him as a ‘Climate Arsonist’, WASH. 




94. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71; Michael Guillen, Physicist: Don’t Fall for the Argument 
about ‘Settled Science’, FOX NEWS (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/physicist-dont-fall-for-the-argument-about-settled-
science [https://perma.cc/XM6L-GNB7]. 
95. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Dissent, 2005 I.C.J. 361, 361 (Dec. 19) (dissenting opinion by Kateka J.). 
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standard.96 Pragmatically, the standard appears to oscillate 
between the two in requiring more than a mere preponderance but 
requiring less than clear and convincing evidence without precise 
demarcation as to the amount of proof required.97 
Given this standard, it is intriguing to see how the Court 
addressed the question whether all cases are created equal in 
terms of the applicable standard of proof when it was asked to do 
so head-on. The issue was litigated in the 1949 Corfu Channel 
case.98 Corfu Channel involved a claim by the United Kingdom 
against Albania with regard to deaths and significant damage done 
to Royal Navy vessels by mines laid in the North Corfu Straight on 
October 22, 1946.99 The United Kingdom asserted that it had 
recently cleared mines in the straight in 1944 and re-swept the 
straight in 1945.100 On its passage in October 1946, the British 
destroyer Saumarez nevertheless hit a mine on its sailing through 
the straight.101 The Volage attempting to rescue the Saumarez also 
struck a mine.102 Both vessels were severely damaged as a 
result.103 The incident caused the death of 44 sailors and injured an 
additional 42.104 The United Kingdom argued that Albania had 
colluded with the Yugoslav navy to lay the mines in question to 
impede future (British) traffic through the channel in violation of 
international law.105 
The United Kingdom thus alleged as one of its theories of the 
case that the mines had been laid by Yugoslav vessels with the 
express permission of the Albanian government.106 As proof, the 
United Kingdom submitted testimony from LCdr. Kovacic, 
formerly of the Yugoslav Navy. 107 He testified he witnessed two 
vessels loading mines at Sibenik (Yugoslavia) and leaving port, and 
 
96. See Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States, 37 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 266 (2004) (situating the standard in the context of US standards of 
proof). 
97. Kolb, supra note 69, at 944. 
98. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
99. Id. at 10-11. 
100. Id. at 10. 
101. Id. at 12. 
102. Id. at 13. 
103. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 10. 
104. Id. at 10. 
105. Id. at 16. 
106. See id. at 15. 
107. Id. at 8. 
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then observed their return “a few days after the occurrence of the 
explosions.”108 
The case posed delicate questions regarding the applicable 
standard of proof. Yugoslavia was not a party to the Corfu Channel 
proceedings.109 It therefore did not present evidence (or examined 
LCdr. Kovacic).110 This meant that there was reasonably little in 
evidence to counter LCdr. Kovacic’s account of events as the party 
with the evidence in question was (legitimately) absent. An 
ordinary application of a standard of proof would thus suggest that 
some credible evidence carries the day over no evidence—i.e., that 
the United Kingdom would prevail on its claim. Given the 
procedural posture of the case, this was deeply problematic not the 
least of which because it would imply liability for a third and 
absent party, Yugoslavia.111 
The Court dealt with the question by going into further detail 
regarding the applicable standard of proof. It ruled: “[w]ithout 
deciding as to the personal sincerity of the witness Kovacic, or the 
truth of what he said, the Court finds that the facts stated by the 
witness from his personal knowledge are not sufficient to prove 
what the United Kingdom Government considered them to 
prove.”112 The Court explained that “[a] charge of such exceptional 
gravity against a State would require a degree of certainty that has 
not been reached here.”113 Narrowly, a grave allegation of 
wrongdoing must be supported by credible evidence that requires 
only limited inferences: seeing Yugoslav vessels loaded with mines 
leave port at Sibenik and returning after a voyage is consistent with 
the laying of mines in the channel. But it does not directly suggest 
the laying of mines in the channel—the vessels in question 
plausibly could have had an entirely different mission. At the very 
least, the witness would have had to place the vessels in the 
channel acting in a manner consistent with laying mines. 
The Court’s holding thus altered the standard of proof by 
requiring not more proof (i.e., 15 additional eye witnesses) but a 
 
108. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16. 
109. Id. at 17. 
110. Id. at 17. 
111. For a discussion of why this would be problematic from a procedural point of 
view, see Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Judgment, 
1954 I.C.J. 19, 18-19 (June 15). 
112. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16. 
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different kind of proof that permits the inference in question with 
more immediacy. The Court continues to apply this heightened 
evidentiary requirement to this day.114 
The key to understanding this application of the standard of 
proof in Corfu Channel (and later ICJ jurisprudence) is to contrast 
it with the manner in which the Court ultimately ruled against 
Albania in the case. The Court ruled that Albania did not itself lay 
the mines.115 Further, the Court did not find in favor of the United 
Kingdom with regard to the connivance theory.116 Rather, the 
Court ruled that the presence of the mines in Albanian waters 
permitted a relaxation of standards of proof as Albania was best 
positioned to provide an explanation for their presence.117 The 
Court further inferred knowledge of the presence of the mines 
from the lack of protest against mining in its waters after the 
minefield in question had officially been recorded and the ease 
with which geography permitted Albania to observe the straight 
from its coastline.118 
The Court expressly placed this discussion of the standard of 
proof in the context of its discussion of burdens of proof.119 Thus, 
the Court ruled that the case did not shift the burden of proof to 
Albania but affected the standard of proof.120 This standard of 
proof was placed directly in the context of more liberal recourse to 
inferences and circumstantial evidences given the facts at bar and 
the relative access to evidence enjoyed by the parties.121 
Viewed together, the Corfu Channel decision thus heightened 
and lowered the standard of proof in the same decision with regard 
to the same question—who was responsible for the laying of mines 
in the straight? This would on its face appear to be further proof of 
a lack of evidentiary rigor by the Court. The same type of allegation 
should require any factfinder to apply the same standard of proof, 
 
114. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 178-79 (Feb. 3); see also Application 
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if not between different disputes, at least in the same judgment. 
The oscillation on point is therefore disquieting. 
Despite this facial incongruence, it is nevertheless possible to 
tease out a common denominator for the Court’s fact-finding 
process. The application of the standard of proof followed a 
common factor: presumptions. Specifically, the process becomes 
uniform when we ask how could the Court draw inferences 
consistent with its expectation of how states (ought to) behave? On 
the one hand, one would not expect a state to connive in breaking 
the law with a particular partner.122 Such an inference therefore 
requires more direct proof.123 On the other hand, one would expect 
a state to know of, and take affirmative action with regard to, 
notorious minelaying by a third party in a strategic part of 
territorial waters.124 The standard of proof thus described the 
manner in which the Court was willing to draw facially opposite 
inferences on the basis of a common set of presumptions about 
plausible state action in the case.125 In classical international 
adjudication, standards of proof, therefore, only make sense when 
they are evaluated in the broader context of inferences and 
presumptions in the context of which they operate. 
This use of standards of proof is certainly helpful in 
addressing the concerns raised in the context of post-truth 
discourse in the previous section. We see that burdens are not 
nakedly imposed. Rather, they are inherently sensitive to context. 
In this context, burdens and standards operate so as to take 
the sting out of some of the invective underlying the post-truth 
discourse: the fear of the hoax or connivance.126 To place the 
discussion back in the context of climate change deniers on 
television, the use of standards of proof in Corfu Channel would be 
highly skeptical of anyone ascribing motive to scientists warning 
of potential dangers.127 This may thus help to bring parties back to 
the table to have an honest discussion rather than hurling 
narrative-based innuendo. 
 
122. See id. at 16-18. 
123. See id. at 16. 
124. See id. at 18-20. 
125. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 20. 
126. See id. at 16-18; see also Jacobson, supra note 92. 
127. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16-18. 
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More centrally, the use of standards of proof as evidenced by 
Corfu Channel is an antidote to strategies glorified in the “Rules of 
Radicals” manuals (or their current understandings, at any rate).128 
These manuals suggest as one of the first steps of radical discourse 
to use such innuendo to discredit one’s opponent and create an 
atmosphere of fear or anxiety.129 Sadly, it appears that in a post-
truth society, the use of such techniques has become common.130 
Or, as one leading international legal scholar recently put it, the 
“manipulation of anxiety is a standard technique of social 
control.”131 The use of standards of proof would minimize 
manipulations of anxiety by requiring affirmative proof of such 
claims rather than mere innuendo thus taking at least some of the 
wind out of the sails of radical discourse participants. 
However, as much as standards of proof appear helpful in 
resolving some of the problems we encounter in the post-truth 
discourse, it again highlights the importance of narratives. The 
standard of proof is highly narrative dependent because it, too, 
relies upon presumptions. The question then becomes—how do 
we justify the use of presumptions? Could they not be easily 
replaced by other, more corrosive presumptions premised in 
alternative narratives? The point is important as it is a central tenet 
of Rules for Radicals to “[n]ever go outside of the experience of your 
people.”132 The link between experience, narrative, and 
presumption is thus as central to poisoning or radicalizing 
discourse in post-truth society as it is a potential antidote to it. In 
other words, the law governing presumptions is going to be 
instrumental in understanding the rule of law answer to narrative-
based discourse—or in revealing that rule of law has no such 
answer. 
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C. Burdens and Standards Cannot Operate Without Presumptions 
The analysis of the leading forms of international justice has 
established that burdens and standards of proof are the 
foundational building blocks for fact finding in international 
dispute resolution. The discussion so far has also shown that these 
burdens and standards of proof do not operate mechanically or 
blindly. Rather, they operate in close interaction with the law of 
inferences and in particular the law of evidentiary presumptions. 
These presumptions determine how justice knows the facts and 
appreciates how the burden of proof is to be applied in any given 
case to resolve hard cases. This means that evidentiary 
presumptions and their relationship to inferences constitute the 
core operational code of international dispute resolution—the 
principle that determines how to resolve factual disputes following 
the international rule of law. 
III. INFERENCES AND PRESUMPTIONS 
The role of inferences and presumptions becomes more 
readily apparent still when one dissects how proof in international 
dispute resolution actually progresses. This section begins with the 
much-touted preferences for direct evidence and how such 
evidence interacts with proof by inferences. Specifically, it explains 
how proof by inference in most (if not all) cases is actually 
dispositive of the factual questions to be resolved by a court or 
tribunal. The section then looks at the relationship between 
inferences and presumptions. It submits that presumptions are a 
certain kind of general inference. It then outlines how these 
general presumptions overlap with specific inferences in order to 
dispose of contested factual questions in international 
adjudication and international arbitration. 
A. Proof by Direct Evidence 
It is almost a knee-jerk reaction to prefer direct evidence over 
circumstantial evidence. This knee-jerk reaction has been 
hardwired into our TV viewing habits: we have been fed “your case 
is entirely circumstantial” as good lawyerly argument to discredit 
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an assertion from Legal Eagles to Law & Order to Bull.133 This knee-
jerk reaction is to a certain extent present in international dispute 
resolution, but it must be placed in context of the central work 
inferences play when assessing direct evidence. 
International justice—like our average television viewer—
has a preference for direct evidence. As one recent work restating 
the rules of evidence in the international investment arbitration 
context has noted, arbitrators “when possible shall make findings 
of fact by means of direct evidence.”134 This preference for direct 
evidence also underlies international adjudication at the 
International Court of Justice.135 
While we are used to the distinction between direct evidence 
and circumstantial evidence from a steady diet of courtroom 
dramas, what constitutes direct evidence is far less clear. 
According to a classic definition, direct evidence “proves a fact 
without an inference or presumption and which in itself, if true, 
establishes that fact.”136 When asked, we might think of an 
eyewitness.137 Or we might, mistakenly it turns out, think of real 
evidence like a gun or the smudge of blood left behind on a broken 
ground floor window. (This real evidence requires inferences to 
establish a fact—the gun was used in the crime, the defendant held 
it, the blood on the window was left by the assailant at a certain 
time etc.).138 
As the discussion below will show, witness evidence is far 
more controversial in the international setting than it is in the US 
setting. International justice instead relies predominantly upon a 
different kind of evidence as its primary source of direct evidence: 
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Nicar.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, 733 (Dec. 16) (noting the absence of direct evidence 
submitted by Nicaragua as a significant factor in its decision). 
136. Kevin J. Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 241, 248 (2006) (quoting BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §1“8” (1997)). 
137. Heller, supra note 136, at 248. 
138. Id. at 251. 
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contemporaneous documentary evidence.139 (This evidence is not 
formally primary in the US setting as it is almost by definition 
hearsay evidence, i.e., an out of court of statement submitted for 
the truth of the matter asserted.)140 This section will outline the 
key differences between the treatment of this preferred form of 
evidence and witness evidence. 
1. Contemporaneous Documentary Evidence 
Contemporaneous documentary evidence is the gold 
standard for global dispute resolution. This standard has been 
embraced in international adjudication,141 and plays a central role 
in international arbitration.142 It has come to stand for the most 
immediate and most trustworthy kind of evidence upon which a 
decision may be based. 
This trustworthiness is partly due to the types of questions 
international justice is asked to resolve. Take, for example, two 
staples of the Court’s Jurisprudence: border delimitations and 
maritime claims.143 When the International Court of Justice is 
asked to delimit a border, or determine a maritime claim, one of 
the issues will be one party’s historical claim to the particular 
area.144 This historical claim would be difficult to establish by 
means of witness testimony as the witness would have to have 
knowledge of prevailing circumstances centuries ago.145 Witness 
evidence in this context is therefore far less valuable as a practical 
matter. 
Therefore, directly establishing such historical claims will be 
contingent upon historical documents. These documents will most 
 
139. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 299. 
140. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Of course, contemporaneous documents authored by a 
party opponent are defined as “not hearsay” for purposes of the federal rules. FED. R. EVID. 
801(2). 
141. Simone Halink, All Things Considered: How the International Court of Justice 
Delegated its Fact Assessment to the United Nations in the Armed Activities Case, 40 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 13, 22 (2008). 
142. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 299. 
143. See John R. Crook, The International Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (2004) (“More than half its cases have involved disputes over land 
frontiers and maritime boundaries”). 
144. Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 
DUKE L.J. 1779, 1789 (2004). 
145. See id. at 1789-90 (discussing the importance of history in border 
delimitations). 
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clearly establish the state of affairs at the time of the making of the 
document. The most frequent such document is a map.146 Maps 
play an outsized role in international dispute resolution as a direct 
evidence of the respective (historical) claims of the parties. 
Even with such maps, one needs to be careful. The Court in the 
Frontier Dispute case explained that maps “of themselves, and by 
virtue solely of their existence, cannot constitute a territorial title, 
that is, a document endowed by international law with intrinsic 
legal force for the purpose of establishing territorial rights.”147 In 
other words, maps are evidence of a fact, not an instrument of 
title.148 They are certainly probative as direct evidence of 
contemporaneous views of their drafters. Their probative force 
will vary, however, depending upon the accuracy and technical 
reliability with which they have been made.149 
In this sense, maps are not different from an eyewitness who 
after all is only as good as her eyesight permits her to be. Further 
their credibility may be called into question even if they have 
significant probative force. The question why the map was drawn 
up looms large in this context.150 Further, it might even be proved 
that the map is not authentic to a relevant period.151 Finally, even 
if one establishes a credible historical claim on the basis of a map, 
this is not the only factor to be considered as a matter of law.152 
Other such factors considered by the Court include geography (for 
which different, contemporary maps may be more instructive than 
historical ones), cultural identity, and, centrally, earlier negotiated 
settlements of boundary questions.153 
 
146. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 9-32 (June 
15) (discussing maps); Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), 2014 I.C.J. 3, 64 (Jan. 27) (same); 
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.) , 2009 I.C.J. 61, 83 (Feb. 3) (same). 
147. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582 (Dec. 22); 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. V. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 624, 661-2 (Nov. 
19) (quoting Burk. Faso v. Mali, 1986 I.C.J. at 582). 
148. Burk. Faso v. Mali, 1986 I.C.J. at 582. 
149. Id.; see also Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Niger), 2013 I.C.J. 44, 76 (Apr. 16) 
(relying on the 1986 Frontier Dispute case for the same point); Peru v. Chile, 2014 I.C.J. at 
64 (maps focus on the locations inapposite to the litigation). 
150. Burk. Faso v. Mali, 1986 I.C.J. at 583. 
151. See id. at 584 (noting the curious disappearances of maps appended to treaties 
and the presence of an apparent wealth of cartographic evidence “for a region which is 
nevertheless described as being partly unknown”). 
152. See Sumner, supra note 144, at 1779-80; see, e.g., Rom. v. Ukr., 2009 I.C.J. at 83. 
153. See Sumner, supra note 144, at 1780; Rom. v. Ukr., 2009 I.C.J. at 83. 
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Many international adjudications turn critically on the 
diplomatic engagement between two states. Fact finding in these 
cases relies on two types of contemporaneous documents: (1) 
diplomatic notes154 and (2) contemporaneous governmental 
documents relating to the conduct of foreign affairs.155 The East 
Greenland case is an early example of the use of direct evidence in 
such cases.156 The East Greenland case in relevant part concerned 
the question whether Norway had ceded its claim to sovereignty 
over Greenland to Denmark.157 As evidence of such a cession, 
Denmark submitted that Norway’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Ihlen, had 
made a promise to cede Norway’s claim to Greenland in exchange 
for Danish concessions with regard to Norwegian claims to the 
island of Spitzbergen.158 
The Danish case rested on two distinct sets of documents as 
direct evidence for the promise.159 It relied in the first place upon 
Ihlen’s own protocol entries regarding the conversations with his 
Danish counterpart.160 It then placed these protocols into context 
of diplomatic exchanges between Denmark and Norway at the time 
by submitting its own documents preparing the conversation with 
the Norwegian foreign minister.161 It finally looked to later 
diplomatic correspondence between Denmark and Norway, in 
which Denmark repeated claims to Greenland and Norway refused 
to ratify the earlier remarks.162 
The Court relied as direct evidence upon these 
contemporaneous documents.163 It considered first and foremost 
the protocol entries of Mr. Ihlen made at or shortly after the 
 
154. See, e.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 
No. 53 (Apr. 5); Sovereignty over Palau Litigan and Palau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2001 
I.C.J. 575, 592 (Oct. 23); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 I.C.J. 659, 
737 (Oct. 8); Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca (Malay. v. Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. 12, 27 (May 23); 
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya),2017 I.C.J. 3, 15 (Feb. 2). 
155. Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicar. v. Colo.), Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. 3, 28 (Mar. 17). 
156. Den. v. Nor., 1933 P.C.I.J. at 37, 70. 
157. Id. at 71. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 37, 70. 
160. Id. at 70. 
161. Den. v. Nor., 1933 P.C.I.J. at 70. 
162. Id. at 37. 
163. Id. at 70-72. 
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discussions with the Danish foreign minister.164 To generalize, the 
Court relied upon contemporaneous governmental documents 
memorializing foreign affairs exchanges as primary means of 
direct proof. It then also considered written diplomatic exchanges 
as evidence to confirm the earlier oral exchanges. 
The same pattern of a crisscrossing reliance on government 
documents and diplomatic communications still remains in place 
in contemporary dispute resolution before the Court.165 For 
instance, Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces 
in the Caribbean Sea involved a critical question when Nicaragua 
notified Colombia of an alleged violation of its sovereign rights.166 
Colombia submitted a diplomatic note sent by Nicaragua after the 
institution of the proceedings before the Court, together with the 
absence of previous notes, as direct evidence of this date.167 The 
Court looked to Colombian governmental documents to establish 
that Nicaragua had made oral demands of Colombia at an earlier 
time.168 On this basis, the Court concluded that “Given the public 
statements made by the highest representatives of the Parties,” 
including presidential offers of negotiations extended by both 
presidents, “Colombia could not have misunderstood the position 
of Nicaragua over such differences.”169 
Here, again, the use of contemporaneous governmental 
documents about foreign affairs proved dispositive direct 
evidence. The Court in this case used these documents to explain, 
and provide context for, later diplomatic exchanges.170 The case 
thus confirms the use of government documents and diplomatic 
correspondence as a preferred means of proof through direct 
evidence. 
Despite this preference, a word of caution is needed: 
ultimately, even contemporaneous documentary evidence is 
viewed through the lens of presumptions. Thus, the Court typically 
does not have a particular desire to get “behind” contemporaneous 
foreign affairs related documents by looking at the documents of 
 
164. Id. at 70-72. 
165. Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicar. v. Colo.), Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. 3, 26 (Mar. 17). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 28. 
168. Id. at 32-33. 
169. Id. at 31, 32-33. 
170. Nicar. v. Colo., 2016 I.C.J. at 31, 32-33. 
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other governmental departments. The issue most embarrassingly 
came up in the Corfu Channel case already discussed above.171 One 
of the questions the Court needed to establish was whether British 
passage through the straight would qualify as “innocent passage” 
(broadly, without belligerent intent) as the UK government 
asserted.172 If the Court established that British passage was not 
innocent, then the U.K. would lose its claim for the violation of its 
rights to innocent passage by the mining efforts in the straights.173 
The problem for the Court was that the Royal Navy had a 
document—known as Document XCU—that outlined the reasons 
for British passage through the straights, namely, reconnaissance 
of Albanian naval defenses.174 Albania had requested production of 
the document.175 The Court had ordered it be produced.176 After 
much back and forth, the UK refused to produce it.177 And yet—the 
Court did not draw the inference from the non-production of 
Document XCU that British passage was not innocent.178 Why? The 
question cannot definitively be answered. The Court on its face 
appeared to reason that the documents could not have contained 
any damning information as the British vessels did not fire upon 
Albanian positions despite having struck mines.179 This conclusion 
seems logically contorted as it does not follow that a 
reconnaissance mission under the circumstances would require 
the firing of shots if the British vessels in question struck mines (as 
opposed to being fired upon from land).180 The British navy, in 
other words received the benefit of the doubt in circumstances that 
on their face would have justified significant suspicion. 
What then really motivated the Court? It would appear that 
the Court is loath to second guess the “secret” motivations of states 
even on the basis of contemporaneous documentary evidence. In 
 
171. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 4 (Apr. 9). 
172. Id. at 10. 
173. See id. at 28. 
174. Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack, International Judicial Performances and the 
Performance of the International Court, in THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 261, 279 (Theresa Squatrito et al. eds., 2018). 
175. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 32. 
176. Id. 
177. Id.; Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 174 (describing discussions relating to the non-
production of documents in Corfu Channel); REISMAN, supra note 131, at 45 (same). 
178. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 32. 
179. Id. 
180. See id. 
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more political terms, the Court may very well be unwilling to rub 
the noses of the world community in deeply problematic areas of 
foreign policy. To second guess states’ motives is to assign more 
than a modicum of blame.181 In Corfu Channel, the Court would 
have assigned such blame to a Western power (the U.K.) with 
regard to potentially belligerent intent towards an Eastern bloc 
country (Albania).182 Such an exercise is a dangerous proposition 
for a Court that in the end relies upon the consent of disputing 
parties across the geopolitical divides to its jurisdiction.183 
Further, it is potentially unhelpful to the pacific resolution of 
international disputes. Guilt and blame beget more deflections of 
blame without necessarily permitting the resolution of factual 
disputes on common ground.184 In Corfu Channel, such blame 
would have brought forth claims that Albania (and the Soviet bloc) 
was the true aggressor and that Britain was merely “defending 
itself” and its rights of navigation.185 The post-truth era has made 
this phenomenon the more readily apparent: facts can be brushed 
aside with alternative facts when arguments of blame and identity 
collide.186 To shy away from finding facts that would elicit an 
identity-based (rather than a strictly factual) response might 
therefore be a condition sine qua non for pacific dispute settlement 
to be possible more generally. Pacific dispute settlement 
mechanisms can do so by invoking presumptions. And this use of 
presumptions allows pacific dispute settlement to avoid the taboo 
of sliding from legal dispute into political confrontation.187 
 
181. Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Perils of Legal Moralism, 20 J.L. & POL. 549, 564 (2004) 
(discussing the problem through the lens of legalistic moralism). 
182. LCDR Weston D. Burnett, Mediterranean Mare Clausum in the Year 2000?: An 
International Law Analysis of Peacetime Military Navigation in the Mediterranean, 34 NAVAL 
L. REV. 75, 78 (1985) (placing Albania and the Corfu Channel dispute in the East-West 
conflict context). 
183. See Michael D. Nolan & Frederic G. Sourgens, Limits of Consent, Arbitration 
Without Privity and Beyond, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 873 (Miguel Ángel 
Fernández-Ballesteros & David Arias, eds. 2010). 
184. David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Blame, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 passim (2018) 
(explaining the psychological mechanism in the immigration context). 
185. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Apr. 9) (hinting that the 
document was about first shots being fired by Albania). 
186. See Strong, supra note 2, at 137. 
187. CARL SCHMITT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN 27 (1932). 
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2. Witness Testimony 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the specter of political decision is the 
more concrete when parties rely upon witness testimony to prove 
their case. This potentially undergirds the skepticism of many 
international jurists towards witness testimony as a good means 
to establish facts. This skepticism has already surfaced in the 
discussion of key international jurisprudence so far: the 
International Court of Justice found a way around witness 
testimony in Corfu Channel.188 Further, the Court appeared 
unwilling to make difficult credibility findings in the Pulp Mills 
case.189 This distant engagement with witness evidence is apparent 
throughout the Court’s jurisprudence.190 
One of the chief reasons becomes apparent when examining 
the robust use of witnesses in a different international dispute 
resolution context: investor-state arbitration. As Corfu Channel has 
shown, witness testimony tends to ascribe motive (why did the 
vessels leave port?).191 This motive (or lack thereof) is frequently 
dispositive in the context of investor-state disputes.192 Thus, an 
issue may arise whether a government official purposefully 
delayed responding to a letter and therefore made it “disappear.” 
Witness testimony can establish when the document actually 
arrived and what happened to it next and why.193 Similarly, the 
question whether a government official was in fact authorized by 
his or her superiors to sign a key document—and why the official 
would have signed the document without authorization—is an 
issue as to which witness testimony can frequently be 
dispositive.194 Finally, the reason for increased governmental 
 
188. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 17. 
189. Pulp Mills, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 72-73 (Apr. 20). 
190. See Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 90, 128 (July 12) 
(noting the lack of reliance by the party submitting testimony on the testimony in 
question). 
191. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 17. 
192. See Todd Weiler, Standards of Treatment, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 259, 285 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) (noting the 
centrality of the concept of arbitrary conduct in investor-state arbitrations). 
193. See, e.g., RSM Production Corp. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award, 
¶¶ 182-89 (Mar. 11, 2009). 
194. See, e.g., Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of 
Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, Award, ¶ 306 (Dec. 6, 2016). 
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action is frequently a matter that would not have been committed 
to writing.195 
The importance of witness evidence led one investor-state 
tribunal to take the momentous step to compel a sitting minister to 
testify. In the Tulip v. Turkey arbitration, a key question was the 
reason why a housing project was terminated.196 Turkey submitted 
that it had commercial reasons for doing so.197 The claimant 
insisted that it had a right to examine the person with direct person 
knowledge of the underlying events—a person for whom Turkey 
had not submitted a witness statement.198 The person in question 
was a sitting minister in the Turkish government.199 The tribunal 
agreed and required that Turkey make the minister available for 
cross-examination.200 
Such a result would be highly unusual in other contexts. The 
calling of a witness under these circumstances would likely 
increase the danger for international dispute resolution to slip into 
the kind of political spectacle that the Corfu Channel court so deftly 
managed to circumnavigate.201 It would therefore be unlikely that 
the witness would be called despite the fact that the witness’ 
testimony is clearly material for the outcome of the case. Witness 
testimony, in other words, is difficult for international justice 
precisely because it requires one to take sides. To take it seriously 
is to make findings of credibility that call into question politically 
laden narratives. Such decisions again bring the specter of blame 
and alternative facts to the heart of the international dispute 
resolution enterprise. International justice thus tends to treat 
witness testimony the way a groomer would a porcupine—with 
great care. 
 
195. See, e.g., Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 3.30 (Aug. 25, 2014). 
196. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. BV v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, ¶ 
60 (Mar. 10, 2014). The Author acted for Tulip Real Estate Investment & Development BV 
in the annulment proceeding in the same dispute. 
197. Id. at ¶ 417. 
198. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. BV v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, 
Annulment, ¶ 115 (Dec. 30, 2015). 
199. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. BV v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, ¶ 
37 (Mar. 10, 2014). 
200. Id. 
201. See Section II.B.  
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3. The Quest for “Corroboration” 
How does international justice seek to handle witness 
testimony with such care so as to avoid falling into the trap of 
political confrontation (as opposed to judicial dispute resolution)? 
The core principle used in international justice is to look for 
corroboration for potentially explosive witness evidence.202 The 
Court provided a general indication of the standard it would apply 
when examining the probative value of witness testimony: was the 
statement “relied on by the other Party” or “corroborated by 
impartial, neutral sources.”203 This quest for corroboration is an 
attempt to dislodge witness testimony from its place in a narrative 
and to replace it instead in the context of “neutral” facts.204 
This type of corroboration can broadly come in three ways. 
First, a witness may simply provide greater detail or precision than 
what has already been established in broad outline by 
documentary evidence. In this case, the witness testimony would 
be corroborated by direct, documentary evidence. One such 
example of direct corroboration is the testimony of Professor 
Ackermann in the Temple of Preah Request for Interpretation case 
before the International Court of Justice.205 Professor Ackermann 
had visited the site at issue in the dispute in 1961 and provided a 
detailed discussion of his observations from that time.206 The Court 
made several findings of fact based on Professor Ackermann’s 
testimony.207 The Court did not make any direct credibility 
findings. Instead, the Court looked for corroboration for Professor 
Ackermann’s testimony. It found this corroboration in submissions 
by counsel, as well as in relevant maps. It thus relied upon the 
testimony together with “a number of other factors.”208 This 
treatment is consistent with other cases, in which the Court 
 
202. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 298 (Dec. 19); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment 
of 15 June 1962 Concerning the Temple of Preah (Cambodia v. Thai.), 2013 I.C.J. 281, 312 
(Nov. 11) (“Preah Interpretation”); Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 659, 717-18 (Oct. 8). 
203. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 298. 
204. Id. 
205. Preah Interpretation, 2013 I.C.J. at 312. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 312-14. 
208. Id. at 313. 
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appears to have relied in part upon witness testimony as part of its 
findings of facts.209 
One of the features to note in this context is that the Court 
looks to documents to corroborate witness testimony. Whether 
this witness testimony is tested against licenses issued by the state 
proffering the witness or against maps, the Court tends to look to 
documents to confirm witness testimony and to use witness 
testimony where the documents already permit an inference as to 
the underlying facts in question—so long as the witness testimony 
can provide the Court with greater precision.210 
Second, corroboration can be more attenuated. After all, much 
of the need for witness testimony in international disputes arises 
from the absence of documentary proof. One way to corroborate a 
witness account is to obtain further witness testimony to the same 
effect. Two different witnesses could corroborate each other’s 
accounts.211 Alternatively, if such witnesses are not willing or able 
to testify in person, contemporaneous reports may identify third-
party statements consistent with the witness testimony.212 These 
reports would corroborate the witness through hearsay 
evidence.213 In both instances, the corroboration would come by 
way of direct or indirect witness testimony. 
Third, a witness may not be able to rely upon others for direct 
corroboration, at all. Rather, the corroboration will need to come 
from context.214 The witness in this instance would hold a puzzle 
piece that fits with the rest of the record evidence. Although there 
is no corroboration for the information on the witness’ piece of the 
puzzle, the fact that the witness’ testimony fits with the rest of the 
picture already assembled by the record can also provide a 
 
209. Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), 
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 659, ¶ 190-92, 195(Oct. 8). 
210. See id.; Preah Interpretation, 2013 I.C.J. at ¶ 86. 
211. See Churchill Mining PLC v. Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, Award, ¶ 141 
(Dec. 6, 2016). 
212. See SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 292 (discussing circumstantial hearsay 
evidence). 
213. Id. 
214. See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 34 (July 16, 2001) (using the legal framework established independently by 
the tribunal to corroborate its understanding of the nature of a contract). 
136 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1 
different, circumstantial kind of corroboration for the witness’ 
account.215 
This quest for corroboration can play out in unexpected ways. 
The Tulip v. Turkey arbitration again is instructive.216 As discussed 
in the previous section, the Tulip tribunal took the momentous step 
to require live testimony from a sitting minister to shed light onto 
the state’s motives for ultimately terminating the investment 
relationship with Tulip.217 The Tulip tribunal took the less 
momentous step to ignore the minister’s testimony—despite the 
fact that it broadly supported Tulip’s case and tended to detract 
from Turkey’s defense.218 The Tulip tribunal did not explain its 
decision not to mention the minister’s testimony.219 An annulment 
panel asked to review the award did: the tribunal’s choice was “an 
illustration of exercising its judicial function of choosing which 
evidence it finds relevant and which it does not.”220 The tribunal 
found that the conclusion drawn from the minister’s testimony by 
Tulip was “not established by the evidentiary record.”221 In other 
words, the tribunal did not find corroboration from other sources 
(i.e. “the evidentiary record”) for the witness’ statement and 
proceeded to ignore the testimony consistent with its “judicial 
function.”222 The conclusion may be unexpected as a matter of 
material justice—how is it consistent with a tribunal’s justice to 
call a witness if not to address his testimony? It is however sadly 
consistent with, and illustrates the price of, the corroboration 
frame in international jurisprudence.223 
Given this potential for unexpected outcomes, it is important 
to understand what precisely international courts and tribunals do 
when they look for corroboration. All three types of corroboration 
ultimately depend upon different ways in which a tribunal can 
draw an inference. The use of inferences is most visible when there 
 
215. See Churchill Mining PLC, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, at ¶ 140. 
216. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. B.V. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, ¶ 
60 (Mar. 10, 2014). 
217. Id. 
218. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. B.V. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Decision 
on Annulment, ¶¶ 154-55 (Dec. 30, 2015). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at ¶ 149. 
221. Id. 
222. Tulip Real Estate Inv, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28 at ¶ 149. 
223. In the interest of disclosure, the Author served as an expert for Tulip in the 
annulment proceedings but has no current relationship with the parties. 
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is no direct evidence that would support the witness’ testimony but 
the witness testimony is consistent with other facts that have been 
independently established. Corroboration and inference here 
work visibly hand in glove: we confirm the testimony (the missing 
puzzle piece) because we infer from context (the puzzle we have 
already put together) that it “fits” and is accurate. 
The use of inferences is similarly present in the other two 
scenarios. The presence of documentary proof that is broadly 
consistent with the testimony, if less precise than the testimony, 
corroborates the witness testimony because we infer from the 
general documentary proof to the specific witness testimony on 
point. This inference functions like a forensic picture analysis on a 
television crime drama. Those dramas frequently create cleaned 
up, zoomed images from a blurry native file. We (and the TV 
detectives) assume that the cleaned up, zoomed image is in fact a 
feature of the reality pictured in the native file rather than an 
external imprint left upon the image by the zooming process.224 
This assumption is an inference from the similarity between the 
enhanced and native image. 
Finally, the corroboration of one eyewitness’ account of an 
event with another eyewitness’ testimony also relies upon proof 
by inference. Multiple people identify the defendants in My Cousin 
Vinny as the robbers of the Sac-o-Suds convenience store.225 These 
layers of consistent testimony create only an inference that the 
perception of each of the witnesses was accurate and credible. 
However, this does not prove directly that each witness reliably 
saw what they say they saw. In fact, as My Cousin Vinny illustrates, 
the witnesses were all mistaken.226 The witnesses corroborated 
each other’s story but did not prove that the testimony was in fact 
true by more than an inference that two people see more or see 
better than one person. 
To corroborate something means to support an inference as 
to its truthfulness, but inferences are not without problems in their 
 
224. See Sebastian Anthony, CSI-Style Super-Resolution Image Enlargement? 
Yeeaaah!, EXTREMETECH.COM (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/132950-csi-style-super-resolution-image-
enlargment-yeeaaaah [https://perma.cc/2H35-X2LY] (discussing the technology used in 
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own right. They can cause a finder of fact to ignore evidence that is 
uncorroborated.227 As My Cousin Vinny shows, they could also 
cause a finder of fact to make findings that do not reflect the true 
probative value of the evidence.228 Thus, they are not the complete 
answer to the question how we find accurate information about 
what happened in international justice. Rather, they raise the next 
question. To understand our desire to corroborate accounts—
shared by international jurists and viewers of crime dramas 
alike—is to understand reasoning by inference. The move away 
from stepping into the overtly politically laden confrontation of 
blame, narrative, and alternative fact thus comes at a potentially 
considerable cost. To appraise this cost—and potentials for 
correction—is critically dependent upon a closer inspection of 
proof by inference. So how does it work? 
B. Inferences 
Inferences are at the heart of proving facts in international 
justice. Documents hardly ever tell the whole story. One could try 
to close this gap with witness testimony, but international courts 
and tribunals typically require corroboration for witness 
testimony.229 This corroboration is based on some form of 
inference that the direct witness evidence is credible and 
probative.230 As already set out above, this means that 
international justice uses corroboration—and thus inferences—as 
the main tool to escape from the dilemma of political confrontation 
and its descent into “alternative facts.” 
However, the problem goes deeper than that. In many cases, 
parties are unlikely to find witness evidence of the critical events 
at the heart of their submissions. In those instances, a party will 
have to argue for an inference from the record evidence they could 
collect that a different event also must have taken place. 
The Corfu Channel dispute is a good illustration of this larger 
problem. The UK could not find a witness of the mine-laying for 
obvious reasons of military secrecy (or if it could find one, the UK 
 
227. See Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. BV, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, at ¶ 149. 
228. For a detailed account of the psychological mechanisms underlying overreliance 
on eyewitness testimony see Heller, supra note 122, at 248. 
229. See Section III.A.3, supra. 
230. See Section III.A.3, supra. 
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certainly did not proffer them).231 Instead, it submitted testimony 
from a defector who witnessed the loading of mines onto Yugoslav 
vessels and had access to the schedule upon which the vessels left 
port and returned to port.232 On this basis, the UK asked for a 
finding that Albania had permitted the Yugoslav navy to mine the 
North Corfu straight.233 This finding would have been an inference. 
This inference did not corroborate a witness’ testimony. Rather, it 
asked for a finding of a fact for which there was no direct evidence 
in the record, at all. 
1. Inferences as Gap Fillers 
Outside of the context of corroboration, inferences fill gaps. 
Here, inferences work like the puzzle pieces discussed in the 
context of corroboration. Suppose the record evidence provides an 
incomplete picture of events. Rather than relying upon witness 
testimony to fill in the gaps—and to fill them in a manner that the 
rest of the evidence would corroborate—suppose the parties do 
not submit further evidence as to what occurred. 
In this context, a finder of fact would have two alternatives. It 
could make a decision based upon burdens of proof. The party that 
failed to provide some direct evidence would lose the case 
precisely because there is a gap in the puzzle. Alternatively, the 
finder of fact could permit the parties to make submissions of how 
the finder of fact should fill out the remainder of the puzzle. In the 
second scenario, the finder of fact would permit the parties to 
prove facts by inference. As the discussion so far has already 
shown, international justice has chosen the second path and 
permits proof by inference. 
International jurisprudence follows a five factor test in 
proving facts by inference.234 In the first instance, the finder of fact 
will establish the likelihood that the fact could have been proved 
by direct evidence.235 If a party should have been able to prove a 
fact by direct evidence but chose not to do so, finders of fact are far 
more reluctant to make such a finding.236 At a minimum, finders of 
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fact will require an express or implicit explanation as to why the 
party chose not to put forward direct evidence in support of its 
case.237 
Next, it is important to assess the probative value of the direct 
evidence that has been proffered requesting an inference.238 Is the 
fact on the basis of which the party requests an inference proved? 
The firmer the footing of the facts surrounding the empty space on 
the record, the more likely it is that these facts will be able to bear 
the additional weight of an inference. Thus, in Corfu Channel, the 
Court may have wondered whether LCdr Kovacic was a credible 
witness and in fact saw ships loading mines etc.239 The inference 
would only ever be warranted if the Court had believed the loading 
of mines to have taken place. 
Further, the length of the leap from the evidence to the 
inference to be drawn needs to be assessed.240 If one puts together 
a puzzle of Mickey Mouse, and all that is missing is a three-piece 
cluster and Mickey Mouse only has one ear, it is not a significant 
leap from the surrounding evidence to conclude that the missing 
pieces pictured Mickey’s ear. Guessing what a missing three-piece 
cluster of a Jackson Pollock puzzle would show may be significantly 
more challenging.241 The closer the link between the inference and 
the evidence, the more likely it is that a court or tribunal would 
make the relevant finding of fact. 
It is also important to consider how many pieces of evidence 
independently support the drawing of the inference in question.242 
Inference, in other words, can be corroborated by multiple pieces 
of independent evidence. In the context of the puzzle analogy, the 
more pieces of the puzzle one has assembled, the more likely one 
can hazard a guess as to what is pictured in the empty space. Each 
puzzle piece laid is additional support for the inference. 
 
237. Id.  
238. Id. 
239. Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 16-17 (Apr. 9). 
240. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 295. 
241. See Roberta Smith, Drips, Dropped: Pollock and His Impact, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 
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242. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 295. 
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A final factor is how significant the inference is to the case.243 
The more significant an inference, the more care a tribunal will 
give to establishing the basis for drawing it.244 The less significant 
an inference, the more willing a tribunal will be to draw inferences 
from a relatively bare record. 
These factors in drawing inferences are not elements. Rather, 
they follow a typical factor test.245 They give the tribunal significant 
discretion in approaching its fact-finding function.246 They also 
mutually affect each other, meaning that it is not possible to isolate 
the decision to draw or not to draw any one inference to 
exclusively one factor. 
2. The Threshold Question of Reasonableness 
In drawing inferences, a tribunal first must answer a 
threshold question: is the inference requested by a party 
reasonable on its face? Classically, international law scholarship 
submits that a court or tribunal draws an inference on the basis of 
such reasonableness only.247 
It is easy to imagine an inference that would on the whole be 
unreasonable. For example, Yugoslavia had a navy in 1946.248 But 
it would be unreasonable to conclude on the basis of this fact alone 
that Yugoslavia used its navy to lay mines in the North Corfu 
Straight in 1946. The submission has no further factual anchor and 
resembles conspiracy theory and speculation rather than proof of 
that speculation. Neither Yugoslavia nor Albania would have had 
to rebut such evidence from the UK in the Corfu Channel case. It 
would have been insufficient even to suggest the inference on its 
face. There is a minimum floor of concreteness to draw an 
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inference. International law deals with this floor in terms of 
reasonableness.249 
Although it is difficult to quantify the floor needed for the 
drawing of a reasonable inference, the difference is on the whole 
intuitive. It compares the inference to be drawn to our general 
expectation of how the world (ought to) behave. It refers to basic 
presumptions about how we expect the world to operate much like 
the inference in Corfu Channel that it is reasonable for Albania to 
have observed its strategic coast line, particularly when it 
observed it diligently on other occasions thus closing the gap 
between the inference and record fact considerably.250 
In short, it requires that in the eyes of the tribunal, a party 
satisfies each of the factors listed in the previous section. If there 
were no other rebuttal evidence, could a court or tribunal draw an 
inference in favor of the moving party without failing to provide 
adequate reasons for its decision? 
This reasonableness assessment does not operate in a 
vacuum. Rather, it uses our general expectations of how the world 
works, all things being equal. It measures the inference requested 
against this general background understanding. If we ask a person 
what the three missing puzzle cluster of the picture of our one-
eared Mickey Mouse is likely to show, we tacitly assume that the 
person has a seen a picture of Mickey Mouse before. As will be 
discussed later on, this assessment thus makes necessary an 
engagement with presumptions when making an initial 
reasonableness assessment. 
3. Plausibility—The Choice Between Reasonable Alternatives 
In many scenarios, the problem is that there is more than one 
reasonable inference one can draw from the evidence. To give an 
everyday example, a parent is in the kitchen while a younger 
brother, Michael, and his older sister, Josephine, are playing in the 
den a room over. They are playing a game that involves a fight 
between Lego figures. There is a thump. The younger brother cries. 
The parent walks over and finds Michael sprawled crying on the 
floor holding his leg. His sister Josephine stands over him, Lego 
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figure in hand, shouting “bad Garmadon!” Did Josephine kick or 
push Michael? The inference would be reasonable in light of the 
typical brother-sister dynamics in a heated exchange that 
developed out of a game. Or did Michael trip and fall? The inference 
would also be reasonable in light of children’s occasional loss of 
spatial awareness while playing with Legos. For the parent to 
establish what happened, the parent will have to compare both 
these reasonable inferences to each other. 
The comparison of reasonable inferences is rarely made 
express in international jurisprudence. It can however be observed 
reasonably cleanly in the Croatian Genocide case.251 The 
International Court of Justice there dealt with the question 
whether Serbia had the requisite specific intent to commit 
genocide of the Croatian population in the civil war following the 
breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.252 Croatia submitted that this 
intent could be inferred from the overall record, listing 17 specific 
factual circumstances which supported the inference.253 Serbia 
argued that it lacked specific genocidal intent towards the Croatian 
population at issue in the case.254 
The Court suggested that it would draw an inference of 
specific genocidal intent if that intent was the only reasonable 
inference from the record.255 The Court then examined the factual 
circumstances submitted by Croatia. In examining these factual 
circumstances, the Court found that in some instances, Serbian 
forces had evacuated Croatian civilians from the heaviest scene of 
fighting.256 This evacuation together with other similar factual 
elements, the Court found, meant that genocidal intent was not the 
only reasonable inference from the evidence before the Court.257 
It is tempting to take the Court at its word: Croatia had not 
overcome the high hurdle of disproving that an alternative 
inference from the record evidence was also reasonable. This 
conclusion does not fully do justice to what the Court found. The 
Court’s analysis ultimately did not suggest that Serbia may have 
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acted with genocidal intent but that Croatia had failed to submit 
sufficient evidence to rebut a reasonable inference that it had 
not.258 Rather, the Court’s focus on the evacuation of the Croatian 
population in particular suggests that the Court made a stronger 
finding in Serbia’s favor: on the record before the Court, the Court 
inferred that Serbia lacked the relevant intent.259 
Following this chain of reasoning, the Court examined the 
potential inferences it could draw against each other.260 It then 
determined that one inference was more readily supported by the 
evidence taken as a whole compared to the other.261 It thus 
concluded that the plausible inference from the record was that 
Serbia lacked the intent in question despite the fact that Croatia’s 
submission of genocidal intent passed the initial reasonableness 
screen for the drawing of inferences.262 
This comparative approach to the drawing of inferences is 
consistent with international arbitral jurisprudence, as well. That 
jurisprudence is frequently asked to make determinations of facts 
based on inferences when the tribunal is faced with multiple 
reasonable proffered inferences from the parties.263 The 
jurisprudence compares the strength of the inferences against 
each other along.264 This jurisprudence, too, suggests that 
international jurisprudence relies upon a plausibility analysis in 
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finding facts when faced with rival submissions regarding what 
inferences the record supports.265 
This plausibility analysis in one sense greatly advances the 
quality of justice available before international courts and 
tribunals. International courts and tribunals seek to approximate 
to the best of their ability what happened on the ground.266 They 
do not rely upon overly technical rules that would create greater 
risks of mischaracterizing events. Inferences thus do not on their 
face seek to distort fact finding in favor of the moving or the non-
moving party. 
But the plausibility analysis highlights the blind spot of 
inferences already discussed in the previous section. The 
comparison of different inferences implicitly relies upon an 
understanding of how the world operates, all things being equal, to 
ascertain which inference is more probable in light of the record 
evidence.267 This general understanding of how the world operates 
already informs the threshold question whether a proffered 
inference would reasonably be entailed by the record. This 
analysis is not one of seeking to establish that the elements that an 
inference is appropriate have been met. Rather, it is one that 
engages the sound discretion and judgment of the finder of fact. 
This component of judgment or discretion is further 
heightened when a finder of fact is asked to compare how much 
more reasonable one inference is when compared to another. This 
exercise relies even more heavily upon the background 
assumptions as to which inference deviates further from some 
hypothetical default condition of everyday life. This background 
condition informs how we can distinguish between reasonable 
inferences when there is no discernible quantitative difference 
between rival inferences along the test outlined in the previous 
section. A plausibility analysis thus is only as strong as the 
presumptions upon which it relies. 
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C. Presumptions 
If inferences are at the heart of fact finding in global justice, 
presumptions are like the sinus node causing the heart to beat 
according to a certain rhythm.268 Presumptions are deeply 
embedded in the drawing of record inferences.269 At the same time, 
presumptions themselves are a certain kind of non-record 
inference that sets the conditions against which a court or tribunal 
can make finding of facts from the record.270 As will be discussed 
in detail in the next sections, presumptions establish general 
expectations about how the world operates. These general 
expectations about how the world operates are not of themselves 
probative of anything. They become probative only if and when we 
apply them to a specific dispute. Then, we compare how the 
metaphorical puzzle pieces of a particular record measure up 
against our general expectation of how the puzzle should be put 
together or what the final puzzle should look like. Presumptions 
thus constantly project over the unchartered territory of the 
record evidence and help put it together into a map for resolving 
the dispute. 
As esoteric as the function of presumption may sound, 
presumptions are nothing new or mysterious in the international 
law of evidence. Rather, global dispute resolution has a robust 
doctrinal framework for dealing with presumptions.271 This 
doctrinal framework breaks presumptions into two different 
kinds, legal presumptions and judicial presumptions.272 Before 
delving more deeply into presumptions in their own right, this 
section briefly introduces the doctrinal understanding of these two 
kinds of presumptions. 
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1. Legal Presumptions as Part of Applicable Law 
Legal presumptions are the most straightforward way in 
which presumption overlay the fact-finding process. Legal 
presumptions are part of the applicable law.273 A legal 
presumption is a rule of applicable law that requires a 
decisionmaker to use a certain rubric when approaching the 
record.274 
Due to its television fame, one of the most commonly known 
legal presumption is the presumption of innocence in criminal 
proceedings.275 The presumption of innocence in the US context is 
a rule of evidence or proof founded in the constitutional principle 
of due process.276 It requires that the finder of fact in a criminal 
trial assess the evidence with the assumption of the accused’s 
innocence.277 The presumption of innocence thus applies by 
constitutional mandate to US criminal trials, in theory, at least.278 
To ignore it would be to violate the defendant’s constitutional 
rights in a way analogous to permitting evidence to be introduced 
against a criminal defendant in violation of the Confrontation 
Clause of the US Constitution.279 
Although the issue has been debated, general international 
law recognizes certain kinds of legal presumptions.280 For instance, 
general international law presumes that state law and specialized 
international law is consistent with general international law.281 
General international law also presumes that state conduct such as 
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the passing of legislation or the use of executive power is valid.282 
These presumptions organize the manner in which an 
international law fact finder will interpret the state law or 
governmental decisions in question.283 However, it radiates more 
broadly in how the international finder of fact organizes other 
record facts that are dependent upon the law or decision—that is, 
how it will organize its appraisal of the implementation of law or 
the carrying out of a decision in a specific dispute by requiring that 
the pieces of the factual puzzle be put together on the assumption 
that the underlying legislation comported with international law 
and was domestically valid. 
As a default matter, legal presumptions are rebuttable.284 A 
party can introduce evidence to show that the presumption is 
inapplicable in the case at bar.285 This means that factual findings 
do not always follow the default rules of legal presumptions.286 It 
also means that the rubric through which a finder of fact engages 
the record remains flexible even in the face of legal presumptions. 
However, the existence of legal presumptions creates a significant 
obstacle for any party wishing for a court or tribunal to depart from 
them. As the presumption of innocence shows, this obstacle is not 
fatal—plenty of criminal defendants are ultimately convicted,287 
but as the presumption of innocence also shows, it is a significant 
obstacle nonetheless.288 
2. Judicial Presumptions Based on Relevant Practice 
Judicial presumptions are less straight forward than legal 
presumptions. Unlike legal presumptions, they are not the result of 
the application of specific legal mandate from the applicable law. 
 
282. CHENG, supra note 12, at 305. 
283. KIM, supra note 281, at 35; CHENG, supra note 12, at 305. 
284. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 123-24. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
287. What is the Probability of Conviction for Criminal Defendants?, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?iid=403&ty=qa [https://perma.cc/K6XS-
MYYV] (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (summarizing US federal conviction rates). 
288. See id.; see also James Q. Whitman, Presumption of Innocence or Presumption of 
Mercy?: Weighing Two Western Modes of Justice, 94 TEX. L. REV. 933, passim (2016) 
(discussing the function of the presumption of innocence from a comparative perspective). 
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Instead, they apply the general inductive principle that one should 
expect the record to follow the pattern of general practice.289 
One of the most mundane codifications of judicial 
presumptions is the US Federal Rule of Evidence governing habit 
evidence.290 The rule permits a party to plead that on a particular 
occasion, a person acted consistently with a habit despite the fact 
that there is no evidence whatsoever to corroborate that the 
person acted consistently with their habit on the particular 
occasion.291 The rule requires proof of the habit itself.292 A party 
satisfies this requirement when it can show that a person has a 
frequent, consistent response to the same specific stimulus.293 
The point of proof of a fact by habit is that one can substitute 
the proof of a specific contested fact (“A did B in response to C on 
day X”) with proof of a different factual predicate: A did B in 
response to C on all days D to W on which A was exposed to C.294 
Although we do not have proof of A’s action on day X, we can 
substitute the consistency of practice from other contexts to stand 
in for an unknown. 
International law permits a similar kind of proof by means of 
judicial presumptions.295 Judicial presumptions require proof of a 
general pattern of conduct by like-situated parties akin to a usage 
of trade.296 It must then place the party to whom the conduct will 
be attributed within that general pattern.297 Once that has been 
done, the proof of the general conduct or practice will create a 
presumption that the person in question acted consistently with 
the general pattern or practice on the occasion in question even if 
there is no other proof to that effect.298 
The effect of this judicial presumption is that the record is 
appraised consistently with such habit. In some instances, there 
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will be genuinely no proof concerning a specific fact. At that point, 
the judicial presumption steps out into the open. The Burlington 
Resources Inc. v. Ecuador arbitration presents an example of such a 
use of a judicial presumption.299 The case arose out of an oil and 
gas project in Ecuador.300 The project involved an operator in 
charge of the day-to-day operations of the oil and gas project as 
well as “non-operators,” who contribute money and know-how to 
the project but do not control day-to-day operations.301 One of the 
contested issues in the arbitration was whether the non-operators 
had communicated with the government in a satisfactory 
manner.302 The non-operators relied upon a letter sent by the 
operator to the government.303 They proved up that as a trade 
usage in the oil and gas industry, the operator communicates on 
behalf of all project participants.304 In this case, there was no other 
evidence whether the operator was speaking on behalf of itself 
alone in this instance or for the project as a whole.305 The 
presumption therefore provided a fact by proof of the broader 
industry practice and proof that the project participants fit in that 
practice. 
However, as with legal presumptions, the judicial 
presumption also operates in the background to organize record 
material. It provides the rubric against which inferences are tested 
and puzzle pieces put together. Judicial presumptions, in other 
words, are a powerful organizing tool for fact finding even when 
they are not directly employed. The Kim v. Uzbekistan arbitration 
is an example of how judicial presumptions can fulfill such a role—
and be ultimately dispositive of a core issue in the case.306 
Relevantly, Uzbekistan submitted in the arbitration that the 
 
299. Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 326-29 (June 2, 2010). 
300. Id. 
301. See id.; see also DAVID E. PIERCE, TRANSACTIONAL EVOLUTION OF OPERATING 
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306. Kim v. Republic of Uzb., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (Mar. 
8, 2017). 
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tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because the claimants 
had acquired their investment through corruption.307 Proof of 
corruption would indeed have divested the tribunal of jurisdiction 
under the relevant consent instrument.308 
The case ultimately boiled down to a fight between judicial 
presumptions. Uzbekistan lacked direct evidence of corruption.309 
Uzbekistan instead relied upon red flags in the investment 
structure.310 Particularly, Uzbekistan submitted that convoluted 
and complex aspects of the acquisition of the investment by 
claimants raised such red flags.311 To substantiate why this 
structuring raised red flags, Uzbekistan looked to indicia of 
corruption in general arbitral jurisprudence.312 The claimants, on 
the other hand, argued that “[t]he presence of many corporate 
layers are elements commonly seen in transactions in the CIS 
region.”313 In essence, claimants made an argument that their 
investment structuring should benefit from “green flags” because 
their structuring mirrored that of industry practice in the 
region.314 
The tribunal ultimately resolved the case against Uzbekistan 
because Uzbekistan had failed to establish “the link between the 
advantage bestowed and the improper advantage obtained.”315 It 
went on to state “[t]he casting of doubt or aspersions as to the 
probity of a transaction is not sufficient.”316 In effect, the evidence 
of red flags and conduct consistent with the red flags was merely a 
“casting of doubt or aspersions.”317 This insufficiency was not 
purely that there was no direct proof of a quid quo pro (this would 
hardly ever be possible).318 The question rather was whether the 
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310. See id. at ¶ 546. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. Kim, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, ¶ 547. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at ¶ 589 (quoting Sistem Mühendislik İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. v. Kyrgyz 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/06/1, Judgment, ¶ 43 (Sept. 9, 2009). 
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tribunal accepted the alternative explanation for the record 
evidence as consistent with the general business practice pled by 
the claimants.319 In other words, the Kim claimants won the judicial 
presumption battle. The tribunal examined the evidence through 
the lens of, and organized it consistent with the “green flags” 
submitted by claimants, not the “red flags” submitted by 
Uzbekistan. 
As with legal presumptions, judicial presumptions are 
rebuttable.320 A party can introduce evidence to show that the 
presumption is inapplicable in the case at bar.321 This means that 
factual findings do not always follow the default rules of judicial 
presumptions, either.322 Despite this, the obstacle created by 
judicial presumptions in some respects can be harder to overcome 
than legal presumptions. The stronger the evidence of a judicial 
presumption the more the finder of fact will be locked in to a path 
dependent perspective in appraising the record.323 Path 
dependence is a difficult thing to overcome.324 It is precisely for 
this reason that much of the work of advocates is to convince the 
finder of fact that a dispute at bar fits into a pattern for which the 
finder of fact has a ready rubric to hand. 
IV. PRESUMPTIONS’ BIAS PROBLEM 
The discussion in the previous three Parts of this Article 
demonstrate that presumptions are central to the fact-finding 
process. Presumptions supply facts where the record otherwise 
would not yield them and thus avoids or modifies the otherwise 
strict applications of burdens of proof. Further, presumptions also 
organize the manner in which we must approach the necessarily 
incomplete pieces of a factual record to put the puzzle of the case 
back together. The power of presumptions is that they allow a 
decisionmaker to attempt to do material justice even in the context 
of imperfect information. Given the stakes in international justice, 
 
319. See id.  
320. SOURGENS ET AL., supra note 87, at 120-21. 
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the need to make decisions in the face of imperfect information is 
by no means an accident. As the Corfu Channel case showcased, it 
is an inherent feature of the sensitive questions that international 
judges and arbitrators are asked to resolve.325 
However, the power of a presumption is also its Achilles heel. 
Presumptions operate as more or less articulated assumptions. 
These assumptions establish facts central to international disputes 
on the basis of what ought to be the case. Presumptions in other 
words encounter a classic moral problem in reverse: moral 
philosophy since the time of 18th century Scotsman, 
enlightenment bugbear, and common-sense apostle, David Hume, 
had an is-ought problem “that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an 
‘is.’”326 Presumptions seek to infer an is (what actually happened) 
from an ought (what was supposed to have happened) and thus 
encounter the same inferential problem. This reverse is-ought 
problem reveals latent powerful biases in the international law of 
evidence that must be addressed lest the international rule of law 
falls victim to creating its own “alternative facts” rather than 
seeking to establish a more objective basis for decision. 
To put it bluntly, what seemed like the potential antidote to 
anxiety mongering in post-truth discourse now appears to be 
headed into precisely the same direction as post-truth 
discourse.327 Rule of law, too, mandates that facts be established 
within the frame of Rules for Radicals’ “experience of your own 
people.”328 To unpack this statement, rule of law has a “people” 
whose experience becomes paramount: its liberal champions.329 
Liberal champions of rule of law thus become a competitor for and 
in policy space rather than fair regulators of that space.330 Rule of 
law itself becomes political.331 Populist leaders from Vladimir Putin 
 
325. Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 16-18 (Apr. 9). 
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of Russia to President Donald Trump have attacked rule-of-law 
liberalism in those terms.332 As Francis Fukuyama points out, this 
populo-nationalist attack is nothing new: German proto-
nationalists like Paul de Lagarde accused liberalism (and its rule of 
law rationalism) as causing the decay of national community and 
national identity on similar grounds.333 The critique of 
presumptions thus radiates beyond “simple” rules of evidence. It 
affects if the rule of law is a competitor for how world society 
constructs its own reality or if it can be a means to mediate 
between competitors in a fair and even-handed manner. 
A. The Theoretical Foundation of Presumptions 
A full understanding of the theoretical problem posed by 
presumptions requires an inquiry into their theoretical 
foundations. The doctrinal baseline for presumptions in all forms 
of international justice is the principle of good faith.334 The baseline 
assumption was first articulated in international law.335 It has since 
been adopted in disputes between states and non-state actors and 
in transnational commercial disputes.336 
International courts and tribunals look to the principle of 
good faith as a default rule of decision.337 All else being equal, the 
parties are assumed to have acted in good faith.338 In other words, 
it must be proven that the parties acted with less than good faith.339 
This rule supplements the use of burdens of proof: a party can 
sustain its burden of proof even in the absence of positive evidence 
as to what occurred.340 All it must do is show that the allegation by 
the party opponent would assume bad faith on the part of the 
moving party.341 In the absence of factual evidence either way, the 
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moving party can then rest on the assumption that it would have 
acted in good faith.342 
The Corfu Channel case discussed throughout the Article is 
one example of this use of good faith presumptions in action. The 
International Court of Justice in Corfu Channel refused to conclude 
that Albania colluded with Yugoslavia to mine the Corfu straights 
in the absence of positive proof to that effect.343 It did so because 
such collusion would be bad faith—it would be tantamount to an 
admission of a violation of the law of innocent passage.344 At the 
same time, the Court ruled that Albania would be well aware of the 
laying of mines by third parties in its strategic waterways and 
therefore would have been able to warn third parties about the 
presence of the mines.345 It imputed actual knowledge of the mines 
from the general practice of states to observe their strategic 
waterways together with past evidence that Albania had acted 
consistently with this practice on previous occasions.346 
To ground presumptions in good faith means that 
presumptions can be divided into the two familiar elements of 
good faith.347 The first element of good faith is parties act with 
honesty in fact.348 Consequently, when good faith becomes the 
basis for a presumption, it leads the decisionmaker to assume that 
the party invoking the presumption acted with honesty in fact.349 
This means that the decisionmaker will assume that motives of 
that party are pure of heart rather than malicious.350 And the 
decisionmaker will also assume that the contemporaneous 
representations made by the party are truthful rather than 
fraudulent.351 
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The second element of good faith is reasonableness.352 
Consequently, when good faith becomes the basis for a 
presumption, it leads the decisionmaker to assume that the party 
invoking the presumption acted reasonably.353 This means that the 
decisionmaker will assume that the party invoking the 
presumption acted consistently with applicable custom or 
practice.354 In other words, it will substitute proof of the practice 
itself and proof of general adherence by the invoking party with 
the practice for proof that the practice was followed in the specific 
instance at bar. 
This use of good faith as the basis for presumptions creates a 
potential problem. It logically requires the decisionmaker to take 
sides before hearing the evidence. The actor’s good faith is 
presumed. This entails that the audience’s or “victim’s” perspective 
is discounted. There is no record basis for this choice. Yet, it is 
frequently dispositive of core disputed factual questions. 
In international law, it means that states are presumed to have 
acted in accordance with general expectations of states in similar 
circumstances.355 This risks discounting the perspective of states 
in similar position to the audience or victim states (consider a 
dispute between a nuclear weapon state such as North Korea and 
a non-nuclear weapon state such Japan regarding nuclear weapons 
tests). In transnational commercial law, companies are presumed 
to have acted in accordance with trade practice in their respective 
trade, accounting for size, place and industry.356 This presumption 
risks discounting the perspective of their trading partners if these 
partners are smaller, from a different place, or industry. Investor-
state arbitration showcases this risk with even greater clarity as it 
risks discounting the perspective of the state regarding investor 
conduct and vice versa.357 
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This theoretical basis of presumptions thus provides a more 
nuanced explanation why the Kim v. Uzbekistan tribunal chose its 
presumptions according to which it resolved the dispute as it did. 
Uzbekistan asked the Kim tribunal to find that the investor had 
acted in a corrupt manner.358 This conclusion concerned the 
actions of a commercial party.359 The presumption of good faith 
defaults to the relevant practice of the acting party—that is the 
commercial party. As the Kim claimants could show that there was 
an innocuous trade practice to structure investments in 
Uzbekistan in a manner similar to the way that the Kim claimants 
had done, the Kim claimants received the benefit of the 
presumption.360 The Kim claimants received the benefit of the 
presumption despite the fact that from the state’s perspective, the 
evidence was similarly consistent with the perception of 
corruption.361 Presumptions bring about this result because the 
state was not the actor and its perspective therefore is ultimately 
not material.362 
B. Presumptions as Narrative 
It should be reasonably straight forward that this use of good 
faith in presumptions will lead to problems. It is not a compelled 
conclusion that good faith must favor the actor’s perspective. An 
analogy to the law of contracts readily shows why. A fictional law 
professor might tell her class “whoever of you dunces can answer 
my next question correctly gets an A in my class.” A fictional law 
student could rise to the challenge and correctly answer the 
question. Did the law professor make an offer or did she tell a joke? 
This question critically depends upon perspective. From the 
perspective of most (non-fictional) law professors, it is fair to 
assume that the statement is a joke. But when the author offered 
the statement as a hypothetical question after teaching Lucy v. 
Zehmer to introduce some levity into class discussion, all students 
generally considered the statement to be a serious offer (and for 
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that matter, not very funny).363 Speaker’s meaning and audience 
meaning diverge on the critical question of what happened. 
Lucy v. Zehmer classically sides with the ordinary meaning of 
the audience of a statement.364 The Restatement (Second) of 
Contract makes this link explicit when it deems a manifestation of 
willingness to be an offer when it is “so made as to justify another 
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited 
and will conclude it.”365 The US common law of contracts as 
summarized in the Restatement would thus conclude that our 
fictitious law professor was serious and did not make a joke. 
Problematically, if one analyzes the same hypothetical 
through the lens of presumptions at work in international dispute 
resolution one arrives at the opposite result. There is no additional 
record evidence to determine whether the fictitious law professor 
was joking. This means that the fictitious law professor could 
invoke a presumption. That presumption would look to other 
similarly situated actors as a frame of reference.366 Our example 
posits that law professors, unlike law students, would have 
understood the statement as a joke. Because the focus of the 
presumption analysis is on the actor, the statement would 
therefore be treated as a joke. 
Tellingly, both regimes seek to reduce what happened to a 
similar frame of refence: reasonableness. The objective theory of 
mutual assent informing the US common law of contracts looks to 
establish what a reasonable person in the position of the offeree 
would have understood.367 The force of the objective theory is 
factual—it assumes that it is more likely to arrive at the true ex ante 
expectations of the parties.368 This understanding of 
reasonableness and correctness is frequently coupled with a latent 
reference to good faith.369 The theory underlying presumptions 
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similarly looks to reasonableness as its benchmark.370 
Presumptions are clearly a result of the principle of good faith,371 
and assume that it is more likely than the alternative to arrive at 
the true contemporaneous understanding of the events at bar.372 
This means that the difference in result cannot be explained away 
simply by the different legal contexts in which the different results 
arise. Both legal contexts intend to do the same thing—reach the 
reasonable result—but then reach the exact opposite result. 
How is this possible? The use of good faith and 
reasonableness in both contexts ultimately reduces the question of 
what happened to one of narrative. What happened is not a 
question of establishing something about the “real world.” In both 
instances, the ultimate determination of whether the law professor 
joked or not is “constructed” to justify and compel a certain result 
(in this case, the result would be whether the student answering 
the question should receive an A).373 We achieve this result by 
super-imposing discursive conventions over the world as we 
cannot learn more about the world itself.374 This means we are 
ultimately asking a different question. We did not seek to establish 
whether the law professor actually joked. Nor did we seek to 
establish if the student answering the law professor’s question 
actually thought he or she would receive an A in the class. Instead 
we seek to superimpose a uniform objective matrix over the 
evidence to draw a conclusion as to how a legal dispute should be 
decided.375 
This objective matrix can be threateningly circular. The 
presumption that the parties acted in good faith overlaps with the 
obligation that the parties ought to treat each other with good faith. 
International law imposes an obligation upon states to act honestly 
in fact and to act reasonably.376 Transnational commercial law 
imposes much the same obligation for commercial actors.377 In 
both cases reasonableness is construed against the same 
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background condition of uniformity with general practice of like 
situated actors that is at work in the use of presumptions.378 What 
is and what ought to be thus overlap. 
Factual findings premised in a presumption of good faith 
construct events out of evaluative claims. Good faith is a normative 
concept rather than descriptive one. To state that a party acted in 
good faith is to evaluate conduct. To state that a party acted in bad 
faith is to blame that party for wrongdoing. To assume that a party 
acted in good faith thus constructs facts from a source external to 
the events. 
This use of presumptions again runs into a version of the is-
ought problem.379 The is-ought problem submits that there is a 
difference in kind between descriptive statements and evaluative 
statements.380 Evaluative statements are premised upon norms.381 
These norms cannot be derived from facts alone.382 They require 
an ulterior source standing behind facts.383 For example, one may 
observe that Romans eat fish on Friday. This would be a descriptive 
statement. This statement becomes evaluative or normative when 
coupled with the command “when in Rome, do as the Romans.” 
This norm—act uniformly—is not a factual description. It requires 
external validation. 
By way of analogy, it is again instructive to look to US contract 
law. Early efforts by Karl Llewellyn to codify the US commercial 
law in the Uniform Commercial Code faced headwind with regard 
to the definition of the obligation to treat contractual 
counterparties with good faith.384 Karl Llewellyn sought to 
introduce an obligation into the Uniform Commercial Code that 
merchants treat each other according to the reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.385 This part of 
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the implied covenant of good faith codified the reasonableness 
requirement is akin to the statement “when in Rome, do as the 
Romans.”386 Llewellyn’s efforts failed.387 The American Bar 
Association’s Section on Corporation, Banking and Business law 
resisted inclusion of the reasonableness requirement insisting that 
there only be a good faith obligation to act with honesty in fact.388 
This episode highlights that uniformity of conduct does not create 
an obligation of its own accord. If that had been the case, the 
objection of the American Bar Association would have been 
defeated as absurd when it was made. Instead, it took until the 
2001 revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code that reasonable 
standards in the trade in fact create an obligation of fair dealing as 
part of the general definition of good faith in Article 1 of the 
Code.389 
Presumptions run into the is-ought problem in reverse. 
Presumptions are grounded in the principle of good faith.390 The 
principle of good faith is a legal command as to how an actor ought 
to behave.391 Presumptions deploy this principle to establish how 
the actor did behave.392 Presumptions infer an “is” from an “ought.” 
Transnational commercial practice shows why this could well be a 
problem. Good faith in global commerce relies heavily upon self-
regulation.393 International merchants and their lawyers establish 
between themselves what best practices they ought to follow when 
doing international business.394 These best practices then mature 
through adoption into a kind of running code for the global 
business community.395 
One need not be too hard-nosed of a realist to understand that 
such transnational commercial practices are frequently 
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aspirational. They are expressions of intent. As such they are 
meaningful normative yardsticks. They express a desire and 
consent to act according to such a set of agreed upon norms.396 
However, this desire or consent does not always overlap with 
realities on the ground: the best practices harden into norms 
because parties include best practices into contracts with fellow 
merchants as obligations.397 Needless to say, such an inclusion 
would not be needed if the parties already could be depended upon 
to act consistently with the best practices in the ordinary course; 
by way of example, form contracts do not require business people 
to own a computer even when notices can be given by email. Such 
rudimentary facts of life—important as they may be—are 
assumed. Compliance with best practice is another matter.398 This 
makes commercial good faith obligations a dangerous tool to 
establish what a particular commercial party did on a particular 
occasion. Best practices, uncharitably, may very well resemble 
New Year’s resolutions. They express a sincere desire to act. Yet, to 
find out whether a person ran on July 4 of a given year, it would be 
dangerous to look to their new year’s resolution to run every day. 
We can now see the “reverse is-ought problem” underlying 
the application of presumptions. They project the self-regulatory 
intentions of states and commercial actors to determine that they 
in fact acted consistently with their aspirations. They thus base 
factual findings in a narrative of voluntary compliance with self-
regulatory pronouncements. This premise is a “narrative” in the 
sense that it creates an arc from best intention to best practice to 
actual practice. It tells the story we wished were true about us. 
Needless to say, the underlying normative aspirations rarely are 
fully realized. 
C. The Bias Problem—How to Test Narratives? 
The currently prevalent use of presumptions has a bias 
problem. As discussed in the last section, presumptions are 
premised in narratives. These narratives presuppose that actions 
in particular instances comport with normatively grounded 
expectations of how actors ought to act. This use of narratives is 
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not premised in a descriptive frame of reference but instead 
imports a normative frame of reference to establish what actually 
happened in a given case. 
The choice of perspective from which to construct the 
presumptions now becomes acutely problematic. It determines 
whose narrative governs the fact-finding process. As we have seen 
in the context of the Kim v. Uzbekistan example, the choice of 
perspective focuses on the actor to whom the presumption would 
be applied rather than on its counter-party.399 It creates 
presumptions premised upon how the actor’s own immediate 
environment reconstructs its own aspirations and translates these 
aspirations into cognizable best-practice efforts.400 It therefore 
anchors what happened in the frame of reference of the very 
person whose conduct is at issue. 
This choice of perspective uncritically adopts the biases of the 
party whose conduct is at issue. Self-regulatory processes 
appropriately begin from the shared cognitive baselines between 
actors participating in them.401 These shared cognitive baselines 
rationalize a set of behavior in accordance with the evaluative 
aspirations of the group.402 These aspirations are an appropriate 
yardstick between the participants in the process. As participants 
in the process, they share the same authoritative expectations. 
The problem is that these self-regulatory expectations are 
used as a means to construct facts in disputes with outsiders. This 
is most clearly the case in proceedings like the Kim arbitration.403 
These proceedings involve states and commercial parties. 
However, they rely upon the in-group’s assessment of its own 
conduct as a basis for factual determination despite the fact that 
the out-group has not participated in its self-regulatory processes 
and does not share the underlying authoritative expectations 
giving rise to them. Commercial parties have a very different view 
whether government agencies act capriciously than the 
government agencies themselves. Moreover, government agencies 
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may have similar misgivings about “corporate greed.” Yet, these 
differences in perspectives are silently glossed over. 
The problem is not limited to such hybrid proceedings. They 
can similarly arise in the context of state-to-state proceedings. To 
begin with, these proceedings themselves may take on a hybrid 
character such as when states espouse the claims of their 
nationals.404 Yet, even in classic state-to-state claims, narratives 
too frequently build up. Events such as the Cuban missile crisis 
have demonstrated how such narratives almost led to nuclear 
war.405 Events like the aftermath of the assassination of Arch-Duke 
Franz-Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 further demonstrate how 
narratives can lead Great Powers to enter into a world war.406 
The use of presumptions thus risks organizing materials 
according to a matrix of alternative facts.407 Alternative facts at 
heart are descriptive claims that are premised in narrative-driven 
normative demands.408 The claim by President Trump regarding 
the size of the crowd witnessing his inauguration is such an 
alternative fact.409 It is premised in the normative demand of 
legitimacy.410 The narrative of legitimacy demands supporters. 
This narrative thus constructs the descriptive claim of large 
inauguration crowds. 
More to the point, the “Rules for Radicals” approach to 
politicized discourse requires that discourse be placed in the 
context of the experience of one’s own people to the exclusion of 
the opponent.411 Rules for Radicals type-manuals thus uses an 
approach to narrative-based discourse that refuses to yield the 
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frame for appraisal and construction of what counts as “facts.” It is 
this radicalization which ultimately underlies the us/them 
dynamic of the post-truth syndrome—“we” becomes the arbiter of 
truth by anchoring valid statements in a shared—and intentionally 
weaponized—sense of community and communal narrative.412 
The problem of presumptions is that they risk operating in the 
same manner. If one is not careful, the use of presumptions anchors 
the construction of facts in the narratives of the very people pacific 
dispute resolutions needs to police. These narratives similarly are 
premised in normative demands. Thus, states frequently make the 
normative demand that they do not torture dissidents.413 
International dispute resolution processes, and by extension the 
international rule of law which relies upon them, frequently 
construct facts on the basis of descriptive claims consistent with 
this demand by sweeping such allegations under the rug or 
treating them as uncorroborated.414 Presumptions thus are 
powerful tools to resolve disputes—but they are a tool that can 
come at cost: the specter of alternative facts. 
V. PRESUMPTIVE POLYVALENCE 
A. Presumptions as Translation 
In order to overcome the problem of presumptions, we must 
begin with a functional analysis. How would the rule of law meet 
its function to transcend community-based narrative given the 
reality of incomplete information? This reality forecloses any call 
for the abolition of presumptions. It also should caution against 
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disfavoring presumptions. The reality is that global dispute 
resolution bodies of any kind must act without a record that would 
satisfy later generations of historians looking into the same 
question. 
Abolishing presumptions would return one to the technical 
applications of burdens and standards of proof. The mechanical 
use of burdens and standards of proof, as discussed already, is a 
deeply unsatisfying solution.415 The resolution of disputes would 
then depend purely upon the procedural posture of the case.416 
This in turn would do little to raise confidence in the ability of 
global dispute resolution processes fairly to resolve disputes. Or 
differently put, a resolution premised in alternative facts is 
preferable to a recognition of decisional impotence. In fact, it was 
such decisional impotence which undergirded the “war paradigm” 
of the colonialist period in international law: as all else fails, might 
makes right.417 If might makes right, the instinct of National-
Socialist legal theorist Carl Schmitt becomes a self-fulling 
prophecy: political struggle becomes mortal struggle.418 
What is more, presumptions also are premised in an 
appreciation of facts. One must prove that a presumption is 
applicable. This means one must prove a predicate for the 
presumption.419 Think again of proof of habit to stand in for proof 
of conduct on a specific occasion.420 To benefit from an inference 
from habit, one must first prove the habit in question. This 
substitutes proof of one fact (conduct on a specific occasion) with 
proof of another (habit).421 
This means that presumptions are factually contestable.422 It 
is always possible to poke holes in the proof of a habit. Likewise, it 
is possible to prove that the habit does not cover what fact the 
party means to prove by it. For example, a habit to put on a seat 
belt does not prove that a person indicated their turn. Moreover, it 
 
415. See Sections II.A.3 & II.B., supra. 
416. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
105 (rev. ed. 2011) (making a similar observation in a different context). 
417. See HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 80-81. 
418. SCHMITT, supra note 187, at 10. 
419. See Section III.C. 
420. Id. 
421. Id. 
422. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 185 
(1997). 
2020] TRUTHS IN TRANSLATION 167 
is possible to appreciate the habit in its richer factual context. This 
means that presumptions have an important part to play to return 
disputes about value to factually cognizable disagreements in the 
first place. 
At the same time, the current problem with presumptions is 
that they do not always resolve disputes. Rather, as discussed in 
the previous section, presumptions can import external narratives 
into the dispute resolution process. These narratives can in turn 
amplify the underlying dispute rather than resolving it—i.e., they 
can shield the perpetrator of a wrong from liability by invoking its 
narrative as a reason for decision as opposed to checking the 
narrative against fact. This kind of narrative based decision-
making is similarly problematic. 
Returning to somewhat tautological first principles, the point 
of global dispute resolution processes is to resolve disputes. In 
order to resolve disputes, global dispute resolution processes must 
rely upon presumptions in order to address the endemic 
information deficit problem. At the same time, global dispute 
resolution processes cannot resolve a dispute by merely 
amplifying rather than testing the normative claims inherent in the 
use of presumptions. 
Dispute resolution ultimately requires an explanation by an 
international court or tribunal why the losing party failed to 
prevail.423 In the first place, this means that the losing party must 
understand the reasoning of the international court or tribunal.424 
Doctrinally, this merely requires that the parties can understand 
the logic of the decision—whether or not they agree with its 
basis.425 
To resolve the dispute, as opposed to determining a winner in 
a litigious contest, the decision must do more. Dispute resolution, 
taken literally, is to find a new solution for the dispute that is to re-
solve its underlying problem. To achieve this, the losing party must 
accept the result as legitimate.426 At a minimum, the dispute 
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resolution literature would demand respect for the autonomy of 
the parties.427 Respecting autonomy in turn demands that the 
parties be consulted in the decision-making process.428 This 
consultation must be visible on the face of the decision itself.429 The 
decisionmaker must provide an explanation that places the factual 
claims of the prevailing party into the context of the losing party so 
that the losing party can see that it was, in fact, heard rather than 
merely given an opportunity to speak.430 It must explain the 
decision in terms that the losing party would find authoritative.431 
In theoretical terms, the international court or tribunal must 
provide such an explanation without offending the dignity 
interests of the losing party. Fukuyama recently theorized this 
dignity interest in the context of identity politics driving narrative-
based alternative-fact-focused political decision-making.432 In this 
context, he theorized that the dignity could be split into two—a 
demand for equal respect, which he linked to the Greek notion of 
isothymia, and a demand for greater recognition premised upon 
perceived merit, which he linked to the Greek notion of 
megalothymia.433 Fukuyama submits that a key driver of current 
identity-based politics is a claim by a growing number of groups 
that the current paradigm of world order fails to satisfy their 
demand for isothymia, thus creating an identity-based merits claim 
that in turn falls into megalothymia.434 This disregard for equal 
dignity becomes a vicious spiral by feeding demands premised in 
megalothymia that in turn could destroy deliberative mechanisms 
premised upon the equal dignity of discourse participants.435 
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Isothymia has an immediate application in dispute resolution. 
To reframe the discussion above slightly, the losing party must feel 
that it was treated as an equal of its opponent in the resolution of 
the dispute.436 A decision that offends the basic requirements of 
equal treatment would denigrate the losing party by implying that 
it is inherently not worthy of basic equal in treatment.437 Such 
treatment would offend basic dignity interests and as such be 
potentially illegitimate.438 
International dispute resolution is conscious of this dignity 
interest to isothymia. It requires that a court or tribunal treat the 
parties with formal equality and substantive equality of arms.439 
That means that the court’s or tribunal’s explanation why a party 
failed to prevail cannot be one that ties a loss to status alone (e.g., 
one party is not a state and states are always right). 440 It must 
provide non-status-based reasoning to support a factual 
conclusion.441 Problematically, while conscious of this dignity 
interest, the remedies available to protect it in dispute resolution 
are highly limited, requiring close to a wanton disregard for the 
equality of the parties by a tribunal.442 In the context of findings of 
fact, these interests are notoriously under-enforced in the interest 
of protecting the discretion of the finder of fact to weigh the 
evidence.443 
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Unfortunate, though, as this disconnect might appear at first 
sight, it helps to open the door for a legal understanding of the 
potential legitimacy deficit if presumptions are used “incorrectly.” 
The legal toolkit available to the international lawyer shows that 
as a legal matter, presumptions can be used incorrectly when a 
court or tribunal uses them in a manner that fails to meet the 
aspirations of isothymia. Yet, it also permits that this failure can 
frequently fall beyond review. It sets up precisely the space in 
which international legal decisions can be binding and beyond 
review on the one hand and potentially illegitimate on the other. 
How, then, does one use presumptions correctly? Thinking of 
presumptions in terms of isothymia here is helpful. Presumptions 
can make broader value claims standing behind them factually 
intelligible and contestable. Presumptions do so when their 
predicates are examined with care and inferences are narrowly 
drawn. Such use of presumptions means that the value claims 
standing behind presumptions are scrutinized in factual terms in 
their own right. Isothymia demands as much—it requires one to 
take seriously the value claims of those advancing a presumption 
and those resisting it. Therefore, to prefer a value claim without 
such scrutiny is to ignore the interests of the party against whom 
the presumption is invoked. 
Just as importantly, presumptions must be able to work and 
be invoked both ways. A decisionmaker must hear the 
presumptions that organize the same record evidence from all 
perspectives. That is, it must render a factual picture that is 
cognizant of the perspectives (literally) of both parties and make a 
careful determination of how these perspectives overlap and 
diverge–and how this overlap and divergence sheds light on the 
value claims they each advance. Isothymia is only heeded when the 
factual picture becomes complex; when we can see, in the words of 
historian Christopher Clark, how each party could come to see 
reality through its lens in a coherent manner and can engage with 
that perspective on its own terms.444 
So used, presumptions become tools to translate between the 
various claims made by the parties. They can only do so by 
embedding the use of presumptions in a rich factual context. In this 
context, decisionmakers can understand how and why certain 
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values are normatively salient. In this context too, however, 
decisionmakers can also understand how and why certain values 
shape the factual focus of our analysis and can expand their 
perspective to take a fuller view of the facts by taking into account 
the values and perspectives of the other disputing party.445 
The analogy of translation is apt because there is no universal 
language through which the court or tribunal could run this 
translation.446 There is no universal narrative or precognitive bias 
shared irrespective of lived experience. Or differently put, the 
necessarily constructed nature of presumptions forecloses the use 
of the “real world” as a tiebreaker. The need for presumption arises 
precisely because there is insufficient information on what the real 
world looks like. All there are, are puzzle pieces and competing 
claims as to what the puzzle depicts. 
The task of presumptions in this sense resembles that of 
linguistic translation in a literal sense. Languages like few other 
human constructs are embedded with crisscrossing layers of 
cognitive narratives.447 Even between language communities with 
longstanding historical contacts, there are terms that are near 
untranslatable.448 English expressions such as “common sense” 
find no direct analogue in French, a language from which English 
borrowed heavily.449 “Bon sens”—a translation suggested for 
example in Collins Dictionary comes close.450  But “sense” is not in 
fact “common” but “good.” In fact, one French commentator 
theorizing on appropriately “common sense” in French notes that 
to accuse a person of such common sense (raison commune ou 
sens common) is to put in doubt their intellectual acumen.451 
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“Common sense” in English has rather a less pejorative meaning: it 
refers to “sound and prudent judgment based on a simple 
perception of the situation or facts.”452 
In reverse, “se débrouiller” is a French term for which there is 
no ready English translation.453 To get by or to muddle through 
might come close, but it does not capture the commonplace pride 
associated with the original word. Similarly, Shakespeare’s 
exuberance is nearly untranslatable into French despite the deep 
historical ties between both countries and languages.454 
Further, the task of translation cannot be accomplished 
through recourse to a universal language.455 There is no common 
denominator through which translation could function. Linguistic 
translation, in other words, shares the problem we noted about 
presumptions that there is no “real language” or “real world” that 
could serve as a tiebreaker for meaningful expression.456 
Particularly when dealing with highly complex, narrative-driven 
expression, translation has to accomplish its task through holistic 
comparison, case by case approximation, and experienced 
reinvention of the underlying material.457 
Importantly for the current context, the seemingly 
insurmountable difficulties faced by translation have not stopped 
it in its tracks. Literary translation flourishes, and authors such as 
Shakespeare have deeply influenced foreign literary luminaries 
such as Goethe despite the apparent chasms between their 
linguistic home worlds.458 In turn, some of the best Nietzsche 
scholars today hail from the English-speaking world despite the 
fact that Nietzsche’s use of the German language is intimately 
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poetic.459 Fruitful communication, in other words, is possible 
despite the underlying differences between the linguistic 
experiences in different language communities. 
Rather than presenting obstacles to communication, this 
difference is an engine for creativity in both the source and the 
target language. There would be no Shakespeare without the 
Italian commedia del arte.460 There would be no German Urfaust 
without Shakespeare.461 The imported perspective rejuvenated 
the domestic idiom with new creative possibilities. The new 
perspective also allows different insights into the source texts that 
become visible only in translation. George Steiner’s masterful 
analysis of the history of the reception of Sophocles’ Antigone is 
one literary example of how translation discovers new meaning in 
a paradigmatic masterpiece of Western literature.462 The American 
translation of Italian humanist theory into constitutional action is 
meaningfully additive to any reading of Machiavelli’s Discourses on 
Livy.463 In a slightly less highbrow fashion, Matthew Pearl’s novel 
“The Dante Club” shows the influence of the translation of Dante’s 
inferno on the Holmes family (and on Oliver Wendell Holmes, later 
Mr. Justice Holmes of the US Supreme Court).464 
Given this experience of translation, it is possible to surmise 
that a similar exercise might be possible in the task of conflict 
resolution. Negotiation scholars drawing on the work in peace 
talks suggest that a recontextualization of their respective 
problems in light of shared experiences is a successful means of 
communication between warring parties.465 The classical Getting 
to Yes describes one of the tools available to this end as 
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“negotiation jujitsu.”466 This jujitsu does not reject a position or 
argument, but recasts it in light of the “interests behind it [and . . . 
] the principles it reflects.”467 This negotiation jujitsu allows a 
recontextualization of claims through translation by using the 
interests and principles as a reference point.468 Getting to Yes 
shows how this tactic worked in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli 
conflict.469 It showed how demands made by Egypt’s Nasser could 
be recast in a way that they would be unrealistic by reference to 
Nasser’s own principles.470 This jujitsu provides a tested means to 
translate that is not unlike linguistic contextual translation. This 
insight therefore should and can underpin a reconceptualization of 
presumptions to drive at the truth between the respective 
narratives of the disputing parties. 
If this project is successful, it again radiates beyond the 
narrow confines of the technical rules governing international 
dispute resolution. Rather, the rules governing factual finding in 
international dispute resolution would highlight the importance of 
the interstitial spaces between narratives making up the identity-
based global policy discourses (be it theorized as a clash of 
civilizations or a return to identity politics).471 There is narrative 
and space between narratives. Dispute resolution would seek to 
claim this space between narratives as a “neutral” ground in which 
rule of law-based understandings of engagement can create shared 
realities. This ground would be neutral not in the sense that it is 
universal. Rather, it would be neutral in the sense that it is 
contextually shared. 
The point of this re-conception of presumptions is that we can 
accept that there is no objective truth to which all claims or 
narratives could be reduced and yet not give up the claim for 
neutrality inherent in the liberal rule of law. Much as there is no 
universal language, there is no universal reality. This does not stop 
us from translating between realities. 
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Or, from the point of view of the cultural historian, post-truth 
discourses amplify our sense of the peculiar—of the intensely 
cultural, or, as it has now become popular to say, intensely tribal 
construction of reality through distinction. This understanding of 
post-truth discourse merely reprises the juxtaposition of proto-
romantic notions of people, or Volk, and its unique genius on the 
one hand and classical notions of rationality, or Verstand, and its 
universality on the other.472 This juxtaposition is not new—Kant 
and Herder died within a year of each other and represented much 
of the same dichotomy.473 The moniker of post-truth in this sense 
is merely the (pejorative) appraisal of romantic claims of identity 
viewed through the lens of enlightenment rationalism. Rule of law 
does not have to take sides in the opposition between peculiar and 
universal; in fact, and ironically, it becomes the more powerfully 
universal if it doesn’t. 
Specifically, the rule of law project can still thrive in this 
intensely peculiarized setting. Rather than focusing on a claim to 
shared rationalist universality, rule of law becomes a call to 
communication premised in translation. It would take at face value 
that the lived experience of each construction of reality is equally 
valuable and normatively valid. It would then seek to find 
contextually constructed shared meanings between these lived 
experiences. It would thus replace conceptions of international 
order premised in might or premised in universal truth or 
rationality with a conception of international order as premised in 
translation and communicative action. It is in this sense that rule 
of law as translation between realities would become more 
diffusely universal and more universally relevant than its 
rationalist counterpart: it is relevant whether or not one were to 
ascribe to a universal, objective (physical and moral) reality. This 
translative account of rule of law is particularly relevant in times 
in which the diffusion of cultural realities is acutely felt in political 
discourse. But it is no less relevant in times of relative calm as it 
would even in those times remind dominant paradigms to be 
mindful of the peculiar lived experiences of those to whom the rule 
of law is applied. 
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B. Connotations and Presumptions 
The theoretical foundations of presumptions permit a 
conceptual recasting of presumptions that meets this functional 
demand. Presumptions are ultimately rooted in the principle of 
good faith. So far, the engagement with the principle of good faith 
has asked how a party acts in good faith. That is, it gave the classic 
doctrinal answer of good faith as honesty-in-fact and reasonable 
conduct. 
To achieve the necessary change in the conception of 
presumptions, one must switch from the doctrinal how to the 
jurisprudential why. What function does good faith serve? Why do 
parties have to act honestly and reasonably? 
The theoretical answer to this question is other regard.474 The 
point of good faith is to change purely self-regarding conduct 
towards cooperative conduct.475 Deals tend to work when the 
parties can trust each other’s faithful performance; they tend to fail 
in the face of constant self-dealing. Good faith mandates a 
minimum of faithfulness in performance to support and protect the 
viability of agreements. A switch from self-centered action to 
cooperative conduct requires a change in perspective. It requires 
one to regard or consider one’s counterparty, understanding its 
motivations and goals, and to act in a manner that is consistent 
with the newly formed joint enterprise. 
This understanding of good faith has deep doctrinal roots. For 
example, the law of treaties requires that parties perform treaties 
in good faith.476 As the doctrinal literature explains, this means that 
the text of a treaty cannot be read literally to achieve an 
unexpected advantage.477 Rather, the treaty must be read in 
accordance with its spirit or purpose.478 It thus must be read so as 
to achieve the goals of the common enterprise rather than to 
achieve self-gratification.479 
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International and transnational law also recognize this duty 
beyond the narrow confines of the performance of a treaty. Both 
international and transnational law prohibit parties from abusing 
their rights.480 The concept requires that when “the owner of a 
right enjoys certain discretionary power” the power “must be 
exercised reasonably, honestly, in conformity with the spirit of the 
law and with due regard to the interests of others.”481 
One can theorize that a determination of whether a party acts 
in accordance with good faith requires a relative understanding of 
their respective expectations and interests created by the 
circumstances in which the parties find themselves as a whole.482 
Good faith provides a means to translate the respective factual 
demands by the parties to cooperative benefits into legally 
cognizable claims. They do so in much the same way—if to a 
potentially different degree—as “negotiation jujitsu” discussed in 
the prior section: it asks the parties to apply the interests and 
principles underlying their own factual demand and apply these 
interests and principles to the position of counterparty to establish 
whether the original demand is ultimately inconsistent with the 
spirit of their agreement.483 If the interests and principles invoked 
by the original demand can be defeated by a stronger factual case 
when they are applied in reverse, the original demand is not made 
with honest conviction as it tends to deny the counterparty the 
cooperative benefit for which it bargained.484 The demanding 
party thus would have to modify its demand to account for the 
respective interests of its counterparty validated by the principles 
and interests underlying the demanding party’s own claim. 
This function-understanding of good faith allows for a 
reconceptualization of presumptions. As presumptions are 
premised in the principle of good faith, they must not just reflect 
its specific doctrinal elements of honesty-in-fact and 
reasonableness. Rather, they must fulfil the aspirations of good 
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faith as a translative tool to permit legally enforceable 
communication between differently positioned actors. 
The functional analysis of good faith itself permits a broader 
diagnosis. Any dogmatic deployment of presumptions in violation 
of principles of other regard and context-sensitive inquiry into the 
relative points of view of the parties is inimical to the principle of 
good faith. Such dogmatic use of presumptions would depend upon 
self-regard, not other-regard. This is precisely what the doctrine of 
good faith in international law and transnational law sought to 
avoid. Rather than forcing parties to engage with their 
counterparty and take the counterparties’ interests into account as 
required by the principle of good faith, the law of presumptions 
unwittingly picks the part of the doctrine of good faith that, in this 
new context, has the opposite effect. To say that the law of 
presumptions is premised in the principle of good faith therefore 
must reject this type of invocation as misguided. 
This means that it is necessary to re-think how presumptions 
may be used in light of their source principle of good faith. The 
point of good faith principles is that they require a matrix of 
normative translation. Honesty in fact is a requirement to avoid 
subterfuge and thus present a counterparty with a clear starting 
position.485 Reasonableness, in turn, requires both parties to 
communicate in a manner that is consistent with their community 
expectations while being mindful of the reasonable reliance 
interests of their counterparty.486 Good faith thus has multiple 
access points that each can lead to valid arguments. It allows for 
multiple ways in which it engage in discourses that are premised 
in incommensurable narratives. 
A way to express this point is to say that good faith, and thus 
presumptions, have to make sense across different 
connotations.487 The current understanding of good faith in 
presumptions was doctrinally denotating and did not allow for this 
linguistic nuance. It focused upon the narrative of the actor. Good 
faith as a translative tool must focus on the narrative of the actor, 
the counterparty, and those affected by the decision.488 Thus, good 
faith is no longer fixed in some objective denotation—nor depends, 
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for the validity of its argument, on a single discourse or narrative. 
It must be cognizant of connotations or open to acting in multiple 
narratives at the same time. 
C. Deploying Translating Presumptions 
The theoretical reconfiguration of presumptions as truly 
translative tools premised in the principle of good faith is only 
more than a fancy string of paronyms if it can actually be deployed. 
It is therefore important to provide a blueprint for the actual use 
of translating presumptions. This blueprint in many instances will 
lead to results that approximate current practice—that is they will 
not alter the result reached by the International Court of Justice in 
Corfu Channel or the investor-state tribunal in Kim v. Uzbekistan. 
Yet, in some instances, it will indeed change the fact-finding 
process in outcome-determinative ways. 
The starting point for the adaptation of translating 
presumptions is to use the toolkit that is already on display in the 
practice of presumptions. Thus, the practice of presumptions 
always contrasts the assumptions held by the actor (the Albanian 
state in Corfu Channel, the corporate investor in Kim) with the 
assumptions held by the counterparty (the British navy in Corfu 
Channel, the Uzbek anti-corruption officials in Kim).489 The practice 
of presumptions, therefore, is already mindful of the duality of 
perspectives at play in fact finding. 
The problem so far is that this duality of perspective leads us 
straight back to the narrative problem discussed in the previous 
section; decision is premised in the assumptions and aspirations of 
one party to the exclusion of the other. 490 Such a decision lacks 
legitimacy in the eye of the losing party because its choice of 
premise will simply be unacceptable to the losing party in most 
instances. Additional perspectives are needed to overcome this 
problem. 
When good faith encounters this problem in other contexts, it 
typically looks to a reasonableness of reliance interests as its 
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guide.491 Could one party understand that its own actions would 
have an effect on a party that approaches those actions from a 
different vantage point? Classically, this reliance understanding of 
good faith developed in international law in the context of the law 
of unilateral acts or unilateral declarations.492 Though its doctrinal 
underpinnings are technical, its overall gist is deeply intuitive in 
practice. Unilateral declarations create international legal 
obligations for the declarant to the extent that the declaration 
would reasonably lead the intended audience to believe that it may 
rely on the actor’s representations.493 The mechanism is one of 
reasonable reliance closely related to doctrines of estoppel. 
The classical case for the articulation of unilateral acts are the 
Nuclear Tests cases brought by Australia and New Zealand against 
France.494 The core issue in the Nuclear Tests was whether France 
was legally entitled to conduct atmospheric nuclear weapons tests 
in the South Pacific. The International Court of Justice did not reach 
that question.495 Rather, it focused on a different aspect of the case 
that the parties had not fully developed: the President of France 
had made public statements that France would halt atmospheric 
nuclear weapons tests.496 The International Court of Justice 
determined that this statement by the head of state created 
reasonable reliance interests in the world community that France 
would indeed halt its test program.497 In light of the circumstances 
of the case, the Court did not require proof of actual reliance so long 
as the reliance was in fact reasonable. 498 
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To analogize the situation to domestic law, the law of 
unilateral acts thus resembles principles of promissory estoppel at 
work in the context of charitable subscriptions.499 Promissory 
estoppel canonically requires that both the actor knew that its 
actions would reasonably induce reliance and actual reliance 
occurred.500 In the context of a charitable subscription, promissory 
estoppel drops the requirement of actual reliance.501 The reason 
for this lesser requirement in the context of charitable 
subscriptions is in part grounded in the difficulty in proving actual 
reliance in the cases in point—that is, they are not the kind of 
actions that would readily bring about a change in action by the 
receiving party but have value to that party nonetheless.502 This 
rationale is reasonably similar to the unilateral act scenario: how 
would the world community rely to its detriment upon a 
representation that France would halt its atmospheric nuclear 
weapons testing? In particular, how would a non-nuclear weapons 
state rely on that statement? Reliance will be a very difficult matter 
to prove. 
This understanding of good faith can be applied to 
presumptions by adding two considerations. First, it must be 
known how each party perceived the conduct of the counter-party 
as part of its respective external narrative. Second, it must be 
understood whether the conduct gave rise to reasonable reliance 
interests. Should each actor itself have a reasonable understanding 
that its conduct would be understood by the counterparty in a 
certain way? 
Importantly, this understanding weaved its way into the 
analysis in Corfu Channel and in Kim v. Uzbekistan, if as an 
overdetermined reason for a presumption that already been 
established on other grounds. In Corfu Channel, the Court noted the 
engagement between the Albanian forces and the British navy 
when British vessels were in the straights in question on prior 
occasions.503 This engagement implicitly supports reasonable 
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reliance interests: that is, it is reasonable for the British navy to 
believe that no military vessels would be in the straights 
unobserved. This is precisely the presumption from which the UK 
benefited in the case—but justified by reference not to the UK’s 
narrative alone.504 It can now be translated in Albania’s narrative 
by contextualizing the UK narrative in the context of Albania’s own 
actions and rationale. 
The Kim v. Uzbekistan tribunal similarly spent significant time 
to anchor its decision in a detailed exposition of Uzbek law.505 The 
presumption in favor of Kim was not only appropriate as a matter 
of international practice.506 It was in fact appropriate because the 
Uzbek law was itself not satisfied by the arguments raised by 
Uzbekistan.507 Uzbekistan’s arguments were thus not dismissed 
simply by virtue of the narrative of the Kim investors. 508 They were 
rejected because the Kim investor narrative was contextualized in 
the context of Uzbekistan town laws and actions.509 
Finally, the presumption matrix developed on the basis of the 
principle that good faith should not be blind to the interests of third 
parties in the outcome of the litigation. Again, the relevant estoppel 
analysis would support the view that reasonable reliance by third 
parties is sufficient to create an estoppel.510 This should apply by 
analogy in the context of presumptions. The factual findings made 
by international courts and tribunals have significant downstream 
effects by creating a foundation for future legal relations between 
non-parties. They thus affect more than the parties. The use of 
presumptions should not be blind to this concern. 
Again, the Corfu Channel case demonstrates that this concern 
is already implicit in the use of presumptions when presumptions 
are used well. Thus, the impact of the judgment of the Court on 
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Yugoslavia was one of the motivating factors in the use of 
presumptions.511 Yugoslavia was not a party to the proceedings. 
The Court therefore had to tread carefully in making factual 
findings that would negatively impact Yugoslavia’s rights and 
interests. The use of presumptions allowed the Court to do this by 
avoiding the question who mined the straights. 
The change in perspective will have a marked impact on other 
cases. The Article began with a discussion of the Pulp Mills case 
between Argentina and Uruguay.512 That case may well have been 
decided differently in the context of the translative approach to 
presumptions. As discussed above, the Court in Pulp Mills decided 
that there was no evidence on the basis of which a violation of the 
underlying environmental obligations incurred by Uruguay for 
building pulp mills on the banks of the river could have been 
established.513 But the Pulp Mills Court also found that Uruguay 
failed to live up to its procedural obligations to consult with regard 
to new projects on the river.514 This failure to communicate is itself 
a tell. It makes it reasonable for Argentina to conclude that it would 
have had grounds to object had it been meaningfully consulted. 
Thus, here we have a case in which Argentina was deprived of the 
procedural opportunity to communicate and consult, and then lost 
the ensuing litigation on the basis of Uruguay’s narrative. The 
matrix developed in this Article makes this result reasonably 
suspect. It makes it more supect considering the impact of the 
Court’s conclusions will be felt by people, flora and fauna on the 
river—parties who were intended beneficiaries of the underlying 
treaty, but not parties before the Court. A change in our approach 
to presumptions thus is not a distinction without a difference but a 
means to make international justice significantly more responsive 
to the expectations of the global community in the rule of law. 
Even as the deployment of polyvalent presumption can 
change the outcome of cases, it is important to note what they do 
not do. We still are no closer to finding out what actually happened. 
The use of presumptions does not avoid the need to construct 
reality in order to do material justice. Or differently put, historians 
studying archival and archeological evidence in the distant future 
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may very well come to radically different conclusions as to what 
actually occurred than the adjudicative processes. 
Again, the Corfu Channel case is telling. Recent archival 
evidence together with archeological evidence suggests that the 
British entered the straights with an intent to provoke a skirmish 
with Albanian forces.515 Albania had apparently anticipated such a 
potential move by the British on the basis of the unsanctioned 
removal of mines by British warships from Albanian waters.516 In 
response, Albania communicated with Yugoslavia to seek out a 
common defense policy for the area premised upon Yugoslav 
mining the straights.517 A communique sent by Albania to 
Yugoslavia after the British vessels hit mines stated that “[t]he 
warship that hit a mine within the zone mined by us bore the 
number RE 62.”518 In other words, the International Court of 
Justice was historically wrong on key factual questions before it 
which it resolved on the basis of presumptions: British passage 
was not innocent,519 and Albania had, in fact, colluded with 
Yugoslavia.520 
The translative use of presumptions thus has a different goal 
from finding out historical fact. Such a search would fail to resolve 
sensitive disputes when they occur (i.e., it does us little good today 
to resolve the Corfu Channel dispute by pacific means). The point 
rather is that the ultimate decision should be made in a manner 
that creates a means for engagement and dispute resolution 
between the narratives created by the parties. The rule of law does 
not impose material justice from an external, objective, fixed 
source. It anchors material justice in the expectations of 
participants in transnational legal processes. It does not create a 
narrative of its own. It provides a bridge for us to understand the 
narratives of others and making decisions from this new, 
communicative vantage point. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article highlighted the important role of presumptions in 
international dispute resolution. It critiqued that the current 
doctrinal use of presumptions runs into an important is-ought 
problem: it assumes that things are as they ought to be. Moreover, 
it borrows how things ought to be from the self-regulatory 
horizons of the actors whose conduct is at issue in disputes at bar. 
This creates significant problems for fact finding in international 
dispute resolution as it premises fact finding in narratives and 
normative claims rather than empirical fact. It is subject to the 
charge of peddling in alternative facts. 
The Article suggested that this problem might well be 
overcome if the focus of presumptions is not on the actor’s conduct, 
but rather focused on the relationship between actor and the 
community acted upon. It suggested that this perspective could be 
anchored in the principle of good faith as other regard. This good 
faith as other regard could translate the claims brought forward by 
actors and acted upon into the normative framework of the 
respective other. It thus presented a bridge through which fact 
finding could always be anchored in the horizon of all affected 
parties by dispute resolution. 
This focus upon presumptions anchored in effects of action as 
communication allows us to make a broader observation. This 
broader observation is that the mechanism of fact finding through 
other regard allows us to deal with narrative without need for a tie 
breaker in an objectively testable, empirical world. It thus allows 
us to deal with a discourse that is increasingly premised in battling 
alternative facts and claims to value or respect. Rather than 
proving one side right by reference to the world, it flips the script 
and anchors decision and engagement in the principles and values 
of the respective “other” party opponent. This focus is anchored in, 
and has been tested by, strategies of alternative dispute resolution. 
The key benefit of such a strategy is that international dispute 
resolution—and fact finding in international dispute resolution—
can again fulfil the role of pacific dispute resolution. It can serve as 
a means both to diffuse and to translate claims made in the idiom 
of alternative facts. It can understand these alternative facts on the 
basis of the actions that brought them about and the effective 
assertion of alternative facts imprinted in the world. By translating 
these alternatives facts, and anchoring decision in a language that 
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is sensitive to its underlying claims to dignity, dispute resolution 
will be respectful to the underlying claims to equal regard and 
equal value that fuels recourse to alternative facts in the first 
place.521 Thus, it again can serve as the means of de-escalation that 
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